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If the claims of two (or more than two) types of liberty prove
incompatible in a particular case, and if this is an instance of the clash of
values at once absolute and incommensurable, it is better to face this
intellectually uncomfortable fact than to ignore it, or automatically attribute it
to some deficiency on our part which could be eliminated by an increase in
skill or knowledge; or, what is worse still, suppress one of the competing
values altogether by pretending that it is identical with its rival⎯and so end
by distorting both.
⎯Isaiah Berlin1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following statutory provision:
In public schools, students are prohibited from wearing symbols or attire through which
they conspicuously exhibit a religious affiliation.

Such a law, now familiar in the wake of the recent affaire du foulard in
France,2 appears prima facie to violate the most basic tenets of the right to
freedom of religion and belief in international law. Article 18(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,
including the freedom “either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest . . . religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.”3 In most religious traditions, the wearing of religious
1.
ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 1 (1969).
2.
The so-called affaire du foulard began in October 1989 when three French Muslim girls
attended school wearing the Islamic veil. The school authorities ordered the girls to uncover their heads
but the girls, supported by their families and the French Islamic community, refused and were expelled.
Similar episodes began to occur at other schools, and the controversy soon became widely debated in
France. The Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin, sought the opinion of the Conseil d’état which in
November 1989 issued a formal statement ruling that “French students had the right to express their
religious beliefs in public schools, as long as they respected the liberty of others and on the condition
that such expression did not hinder normal teaching or order within the school.” ANNA ELISABETTA
GALEOTTI, TOLERATION AS RECOGNITION 117 (2002). This ruling favoring tolerance was subsequently
reinterpreted in September 1994 by the new conservative Minister of Education, François Bayrou, who
issued an official directive to all public school principals stating that only discreet and modest religious
symbols should be tolerated in schools. Id.; Eduardo Cue, For France, Girls in Head Scarves Threaten
Secular Ideals, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 5, 1994, at 8. Following extensive public consultations
by the so-called Stasi Commission, President Jacques Chirac signed Law 2004-228 banning the wearing
of ostentatious religious symbols in public schools. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal
Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. The
National Assembly approved the bill by an overwhelming majority vote of 494 to 36 and the Senate by a
majority of 276 to 20. T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United
States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 422 (2004).
3.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 2(1), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 931/2000,
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 82d Sess., ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2004) (“[T]he
freedom to manifest one’s religion encompasses the right to wear clothes or attire in public which is in
conformity with the individual’s faith or religion.”).
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symbols or attire—for example, the Jewish yarmulke, the Sikh turban, or the
Islamic hijab—is not a simple matter of choice but a matter of religious duty,
ritual, and observance. Within different traditions, there are a variety of ways
in which religious symbols work. In Christianity, for example, the crucifix is
worn as an ornament of conviction whereas, in Judaism, the yarmulke is worn
as a matter of religious obligation. For certain ethnic, religious, and cultural
groups (whether they comprise the majority or a minority), wearing religious
or traditional dress is closely bound up with spiritual practices and is a
defining element of group identity. For Muslim girls and women the wearing
of the hijab may be a form of social obligation that is religiously motivated
rather than a matter of religious duty per se. This, in turn, has an
intergenerational dimension with the continuity of religious tradition being
seen as a critical factor in the survival of specific cultural, religious, and
linguistic groups.
While the specific historical reasons for the wearing of religious
symbols and attire may vary in different religious traditions, the one common
feature is the centrality of such practices to the manifestation of religious
belief. Given this widely acknowledged fact, on what possible grounds—and
for what reasons—can a state seek to limit this aspect of the freedom to
manifest one’s religion? Considerable scholarly attention has been paid in
recent years to the French law proscribing the wearing of religious symbols in
public schools 4 and to the issue of Muslim minorities in European nationstates more generally.5 This Article responds to a deeper concern. Stepping
back from these debates, and from some of the more comfortable
philosophical and jurisprudential assumptions upon which they appear to rest,
it aims at a more rigorous theoretical treatment of the subject. The Article thus
4.
There is now a voluminous literature on the affaire du foulard. See, e.g., Dina Alsowayel,
The Elephant in the Room: A Commentary on Steven Gey’s Analysis of the French Headscarf Ban, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 103 (2005); Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the
French Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2005) (citing various
sources); T. Jeremy Gunn, French Secularism as Utopia and Myth, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 81 (2005)
(responding to Gey’s discussion of the affaire du foulard); see also Cynthia DeBula Baines, L’Affaire
des Foulards—Discrimination, or the Price of a Secular Public Education System?, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 303 (1996); Elisa T. Beller, The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d’état on the Role of
Religion and Culture in French Society, 39 TEXAS INT’L L. J. 581 (2004); Sebastian Poulter, Muslim
Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France, 17 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 43 (1997).
5.
Just in the last year, see, for example, Elizabeth F. Defeis, Religious Liberty and
Protections in Europe, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 73 (2006) (reviewing international mechanisms
monitoring religious freedom in Europe); Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Ino Augsberg, The Myth of the Neutral
State: The Relationship Between State and Religion in the Face of New Challenges, 8 GERMAN L.J. 143
(2007) (arguing for a reshaping of the principle of state neutrality); M. Todd Parker, The Freedom to
Manifest Religious Belief: An Analysis of the Necessity Clauses of the ICCPR and ECHR, 17 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 91 (2006) (examining whether restrictions on manifestations of religion are justifiable
under international human rights instruments); Ian Ward, Headscarf Stories, 29 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 315 (2006) (discussing, in particular, the cases of Shabina Begum in England and Leyla
Sahin in Turkey, as well as the fictional characters Teslime, Ipek, and Kalife in Orhan Pamuk’s
acclaimed novel Snow); and Cees Maris, Laïcité in the Low Countries?: On Headscarves in a Neutral
State (Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int’l and Reg’l Econ. Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 14/2007),
available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/07/071401.rtf (discussing the 2003 proposal to ban
Islamic headscarves in public institutes in the Netherlands). See generally REGULATING RELIGION: CASE
STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE (James T. Richardson ed., 2004) (discussing the interaction of
various religions and governments around the world).
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asks whether there is a coherent notion of religious freedom in international
law and, if not, why not? In identifying certain problematic aspects of the
extant literature, it advances an argument that seeks to overcome the current
impasse in liberal theorizing: the idea of value pluralism as a theoretical basis
for religious freedom in international law.
Part II first sets out three potential grounds of limitation on the freedom
to manifest religion or belief. In suggesting that these arguments fail
adequately to capture what lies at the heart of controversies surrounding the
wearing of religious symbols, Part III then considers the background question
of the identity of the subject of international law—the notion of a “people” or
“nation” with a right to self-determination in the legal form of a “state.”
Within the very concept of “nation-state,” the tension between nationalism
and liberalism is shown to generate competing conceptions of pluralism,
which in turn shape how states seek to accommodate religious, ethnic, and
cultural diversity. Part IV illustrates this thesis by considering how challenges
to laws proscribing the wearing of religious symbols have been dealt with in
four differently situated nation-states: France, Turkey, Germany, and the
United States. In arguing that some forms of group difference require certain
“group-specific” rights, Part V then addresses how international law seeks to
reconcile basic norms of equality and nondiscrimination with equally basic
commitments (such as under Article 27 of the ICCPR) to the freedom of
minorities to profess and practice their religions and beliefs.
Finally, Part VI argues that, together, these considerations suggest
certain limits to the rationalist ambition of advancing a tidy and universally
applicable theory of religious freedom in international law.6 These limits arise
by virtue of the doctrine of value pluralism, which takes the plurality of
valuable options and ways of life to be ultimate and irreducible. 7 Value
pluralism is thus sensitive to the fact that the fundamental rights of liberal
thought are subject to disabling indeterminacies, a recognition that compels us
to accept that there is a plurality of ways of thinking not just about the good,
6.
My project is similar in inspiration to John Gray’s recent attempt to formulate a variety of
“agonistic” liberalism which is “grounded, not in rational choice, but in the limits of rational
choice⎯limits imposed by the radical choices we are often constrained to make among goods that are
both inherently rivalrous, and often constitutively uncombinable, and sometimes incommensurable, or
rationally incomparable.” JOHN GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE: POLITICS AND CULTURE AT THE CLOSE
OF THE MODERN AGE 68-69 (1995) [hereinafter GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE]. The argument thus
pursues three lines of critique similar to those advanced by Joseph Raz, as follows: (i) in terms of
method, by rejecting the notion of a fixed structure of basic liberties in recognition of the fact that the
form of rights that best promotes autonomy is necessarily indeterminate and variable; (ii) by recognizing
that intrinsically valuable forms of human flourishing and ways of life enter into the value of autonomy
itself such that forms of autonomous choice will vary in different societies; and (iii) in acknowledging
that incommensurabilities between ultimate values set a limit to the rationalist ambitions of legal and
political philosophy. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165-216, 321-366 (1986) [hereinafter
RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM].
7.
For discussion of value pluralism as a moral theory in political philosophy, see JOSEPH
RAZ, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 155 (1994). In summary terms, the central features of value pluralism
are its anti-monistic position as an ethical theory and its view that conflicts of values are an intrinsic part
of human life, that there is no single right answer in choosing between them, and that conflicts between
entire ways of life suggest that not only individuals but also communities may be the principal bearers of
rights (and duties) in pluralist political orders. GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 69,
138. See also infra Section VI.B.
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but also about the right. Different ways of thinking about religious freedom
thus lead to a pluralism of conceptions of the right with the result that no
single theory of justice emerges as triumphant. 8 International law, as an
expression of “international right,” should reflect this reality. Integral to this
recognition is the intrinsic and undeniable value of communal goods (or what
Raz has termed “inherently public goods”9) to autonomy. We should therefore
expect different models of toleration and compromised conceptions of
neutrality. On this basis alone, it is hopeless for international legal theory to
avoid communal goods altogether. The communal has mattered historically
(especially in the area of religious freedom), and it matters at the theoretical
level. While the formal structure of international human rights law reflects this
reality by recognizing norms of self-determination and “minority” rights, in
general these collective rights have been undertheorized in the literature on
religious freedom. This Article is a response to that omission.
II.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO WEAR RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS

Let us turn to the first question: what are the possible grounds on which
states may seek to limit the freedom to manifest religion or belief? States, in
fact, have a number of possible interests in the regulation of religious
symbols. One is to control specific environments—for example, parliaments,
courts, prisons, or armies—for certain official purposes. In these
environments, religious symbols may directly obstruct the regulation of state
functions. Another is the incidental interference of religious symbols in fields
of regulation where the state has important interests such as public health,
safety, and order. Wearing a turban while riding a motorcycle may make an
individual more susceptible to head injuries and thus implicate the state’s
interest in public health; wearing a burka in a driver’s license photograph may
make it harder to identify people and thus implicate the state’s interest in
public safety. A third state interest is implicated when religious symbols
interfere with public settings, which are themselves highly symbolic of the
identity of the state. The presence of religious symbols in courts and police
stations in certain states may raise concerns of this kind.
Interests of at least the first two kinds are recognized under Article 18(3)
as permissible grounds of limitation on the manifestation of religious belief.10
8.
I use the terms “good” and “right” here in the traditional Rawlsian sense of seeking to
explain how people adhering to different comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines
may affirm the same conception of justice on different moral and political grounds. Following Waldron,
I argue that Rawls’s notion of an “overlapping consensus” cannot resolve the dilemma of “justicepluralism” and “disagreement about rights.” See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 149-50,
162 (1999) (arguing that “[s]o long as each conception of the good generates its own conception of
justice . . . it is impossible for competing conceptions of the good to be related to a single conception of
justice (such as [Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness]) in the strong moral relation that Rawls refers to
as ‘overlapping consensus’”).
9.
See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
10. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 18(3) (“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”). The third concern raises
questions of state endorsement of or entanglement with religion. The ICCPR contains no equivalent of
the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. Theoretically, therefore, international human rights
law does not restrict states in either endorsing or cooperating with religions, including through the
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The next three sections will discuss three separate grounds of limitation the
French government sought to invoke in the affaire du foulard. This example
will illustrate how various justifications are employed and what their
weaknesses are.
A.

Public Order

The first state interest invoked by France is the protection of public
order. According to this argument, the wearing of religious symbols is seen as
being linked to an increased risk of threats and violence, whether because of
intolerance and xenophobia directed towards an unpopular religious minority,
or because of a perceived threat of the rise of religious fundamentalism
directed towards the democratic values and institutions of the state. Neither of
these justifications withstands close scrutiny, however. In the first case,
seeking to minimize differences by limiting the religious freedom of a
minority in order to address threats of violence by the majority is a reversal of
logic that, in effect, punishes the victim. A more appropriate response would
be to foster recognition of difference and toleration by the majority on the
basis of respect for the religious freedom of minorities freely to practice their
religion.
In the second case, it is not immediately obvious (at least not without
considering the history and national identity of specific states, as I explain
further below 11 ) why the wearing of the yarmulke, turban, or hijab is an
indicia either of extremism or of any particular threat to the state. This view
raises the illogical implication that any member of a religious tradition who
takes her religious obligations seriously and complies with her religion’s dress
code is, on that basis alone, disloyal to liberal institutions and a threat to the
liberal order. Such a position derives more from fear and intolerance than
from any sound evidence and is inconsistent with a robust conception of the
right to freedom of religion, itself one of the hallmarks of the liberal tradition.
Indeed, if the mere wearing of a religious symbol in the public sphere were to
be regarded as a threat to the values and institutions of the state, then the
scope of the freedom to manifest religion or belief would be so severely
curtailed as to be virtually nonexistent. For this reason, limitations based on
considerations of public order are not, on their own terms, especially
convincing.12
display of religious symbols in official settings or the wearing of religious attire by state officials
(provided, of course, the state respects all other human rights norms including the rights to equality and
nondiscrimination).
11. My analysis in this Article does not seek, however, to cover more complex sociological
questions concerning the current conditions of inter-ethnic relations in European states, relations
between local ethnic and religious groups and movements in foreign countries, or the political
mobilization of different groups and the nature of their demands with the resulting potential for violence
and other rights violations. My discussion is limited to the more modest task of seeking to clarify certain
conceptual issues concerning the rights of religious minorities under international human rights norms.
12. The activities of a certain religious community or group of religious communities may be
seen to threaten public order simply by virtue of being visible, different, or successful. While this fact
alone does not permit the state to suppress such manifestations of religion or belief as a matter of public
policy, states may seek more narrowly to impose “reasonable” limitations on such manifestations (of the
kind embodied in laws proscribing the wearing of religious symbols) in order to prevent public disorder.
As noted by Karl Partsch:
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Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of Others

A second possible ground for limiting the freedom to manifest religion is
to protect the “fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 13 The Conseil
d’état in France has stated that the right to freedom of religion does not
include the right of students to display religious symbols that “individually or
collectively, or to their ostentatious or demonstrative character, constitute an
exercise of pressure, provocation, proselytizing or propaganda.”14 This raises
complex arguments regarding the practice of proselytism and its associated
difficulties. 15 I do not wish to revisit those arguments here other than to
suggest that the reasons for limiting the manifestation of religion in this case
are arguably less convincing than in instances of overt acts of proselytism
given that the wearing of religious symbols does not raise the same degree of
concern of coercion and harm to others.16 It is difficult to see, for example,
how a Sikh student wearing a turban or a Jewish student wearing a yarmulke
could, on this basis alone, be regarded as exercising “pressure, provocation,
proselytizing or propaganda” towards other students.17 Indeed, if there is an
[L]imitations on freedom to manifest one’s religion cannot be imposed to protect ordre
public with its general connotations of national public policy, but only where necessary to
protect public order narrowly construed, i.e., to prevent public disorder. A state whose
public policy is atheism, for example, cannot invoke Article 18(3) to suppress
manifestations of religion or beliefs.
Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 209, 212-13 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981) (footnote omitted). For discussion on the limitations clauses in the ICCPR and
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), see Parker, supra note 5.
13. These are the words used in the ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 18(3).
14. See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Note, Rhetoric or Rights? When Culture and Religion Bar
Girls’ Right to Education, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 1073, 1111 (2004) (quoting KATARINA TOMAŚEVSKI,
EDUCATION DENIED: COSTS AND REMEDIES 168 (2003)).
15. See, e.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1993). For a detailed
discussion of this case, see Peter G. Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in PROTECTING THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 192, 200-06 (Peter G. Danchin &
Elizabeth A. Cole eds., 2002). Proselytism raises complex questions regarding the relationship between
individual rights and differing conceptions of collective goods. See Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and
Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J.
(forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes].
16. The question of whether wearing religious attire on its own constitutes a form of
proselytism has been a contentious issue in France. Initially, the Conseil d’état ruled that there was no
evidence to suggest that donning a religious symbol such as the headscarf amounted to proselytism. See
David Beriss, Scarves, Schools, and Segregation: The Foulard Affair, 8 FRENCH POL. & SOC’Y 1 (1990);
Miriam Feldblum, Paradoxes of Ethnic Politics: The Case of Franco-Maghrebis in France, 16 ETHNIC
& RACIAL STUD. 52 (1993). Subsequently, however, the Bayrou directive in 1994 declared
“ostentatious” signs of religious belief to be a form of proselytism. See ALEC G. HARGREAVES,
IMMIGRATION, “RACE” AND ETHNICITY IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 127 (1995).
17. This is not to say, however, that the wearing of religious symbols raises no concerns of
coercion or harm to others. The issue may arise in different contexts—for example, in terms of pressure
exerted by students’ peers both in and out of school—with accordingly varying factors to consider. One
particularly contested issue that has arisen is whether teachers in secondary schools or judges in
courtrooms may wear the Islamic headscarf. These cases tend to turn on how certain interrelated
variables such as the attributes of the actor and the place of the action are understood with respect to the
notion of coercion. Unlike in the case of students in public schools, teachers and judges are state
officials. This raises questions of state endorsement and entanglement with religion, at least in relation
to officials who are members of the dominant or majority religions. Of course, in relation to religious
minorities different considerations will apply. See, e.g., Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
429, 449. A teacher in a public primary school, after embracing Islam, sought to wear the hijab in class.
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exercise of pressure or proselytizing to be found, it is more likely to exist in
the home between parents and their children or emanate more broadly from
the surrounding religious community. This suggestion is a heated and divisive
issue in France with controversial claims being made that the Islamic
headscarf is a symbol of the invisibility and subordination of women—
especially of girls who are perceived to be acting under family pressure—and
with calls arising for the state to intervene to prevent Muslim parents from
harming the autonomy and “life chances” of their children.18
C.

Autonomy and Gender Equality

This last point raises a third possible ground for limiting the freedom to
manifest religion: to protect women—especially girls—from discrimination.
Some support for this view can be found in Article 2(f) of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
which requires states to “take all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that
constitute discrimination against women.”19 Could it be argued, therefore, that
the rationale for laws proscribing the wearing of headscarves may be
grounded in concerns for the autonomy and equality of Muslim girls? This
argument raises difficult questions to which I shall return below. At this stage
of my analysis, I wish only to make two preliminary points.
First, this argument presupposes the right of the state to judge whether to
tolerate or interfere with cultural, religious, or non-conformist dress codes.
Even if one accepts this proposition (which, as we shall see, raises serious
difficulties for liberal theories of toleration), it is far from evident, and indeed
deeply contested both within and outside Islam, whether wearing the hijab
Under Section 6 of the Public Education Act, she was prohibited as a civil servant from manifesting her
religious affiliation while in class. Id. at 452. After exhausting all domestic remedies, she took her case
to the European Court of Human Rights arguing that the cantonal law was in violation of Article 9 of the
ECHR. Id. The Court held that her right to freedom of religion had to be balanced against the right of
children to receive an education free from any religious influences apart from those decided by parents
or legal guardians. Id. at 462. The Court thus agreed with the Swiss courts that as a civil servant with the
potential to influence young children, the applicant could not continue to wear the veil while in class. Id.
For the reasons discussed below, I believe this case to be wrongly decided. For a recent case involving a
student’s attempt to wear the veil, see Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993) (indicating that the refusal of a university to allow the applicant to wear a
headscarf in her identity photograph was not a restriction on her right to manifest her religion). For
criticism of this decision, see CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 118 (2001) (arguing that the reasoning of the Commission suggests a
“level of conceptual confusion”).
18. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of
Headscarves, Religious Expression and Women’s Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L. L. 367, 406-07 (2007) (suggesting that “girls may be especially subject to pressure,
including peer pressure, in regards to dress, and need extra protection from religious extremists and
coercive family members”).
19. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 2(f),
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Article 5(a) of CEDAW further requires states to take
appropriate measures:
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on the
stereotyped roles for men and women.
Id. art. 5(a).
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causes harm either to those who wear it or to society in general. The reasons
for wearing the hijab are not monolithic. For some Muslim women, the veil is
a symbol of living in a Western society, such as France, without foregoing
one’s Islamic identity and is thus not a statement of oppression but of
emancipation. 20 For others, it may have a political meaning expressing
solidarity with Muslims worldwide or support for different conceptions of
political Islam. 21 For still others, it is more of a religiously inspired social
obligation symbolizing piety and chastity and a rejection of the way in which
women are sexually exploited and represented in Western society.22 In reality,
these meanings likely overlap for individual Muslim women and between
different Muslim communities, creating a range of tensions and forces with
women both defending their religion and culture while at the same time
struggling against conservative conceptions of gender and sex equality. 23
Given this multitude of meanings and ways in which the hijab actually works
as a religious symbol, its blanket restriction by the state on the assumption that
it symbolizes women’s oppression simply will not do.24
Second, this argument is entangled in complex ways with the fraught
and unstable public-private divide that characterizes liberal rights discourse. If
the true rationale for the law is concern for the autonomy of Muslim girls and
discrimination vis-à-vis the cultural impositions of the family, then should not
the state ban the Islamic headscarf altogether and not just in public schools?
Such an argument opens the way to a wider range of state interference than is
generally regarded as acceptable in a liberal democratic state premised on
respect for human rights. Conversely, if the headscarf is to be banned only in
20. By showing that they are participating in the public spheres of work and education without
rejecting their Islamic identity, Muslim women may actually open a greater space for emancipation,
especially in more conservative communities struggling to redefine their collective identities in
sometimes hostile economic and social environments. For a discussion of the position and identity of
Islamic communities in Western Europe, see ISLAM AND EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (Silvio Ferrari &
Anthony Bradney eds., 2000) and ISLAM IN EUROPE: THE POLITICS OF RELIGION AND COMMUNITY
(Steven Vertovec & Ceri Peach eds., 1997).
21. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 5, at 331 (discussing veil-wearing as a “revolutionary gesture”
reflecting a view of Islam in modern Turkey as a “culture of protest” (quoting ORHAN PAMUK, SNOW
116 (Maureen Freely trans., 2004) (2002))); see also Norma Claire Moruzzi, A Problem with
Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social Identity, 22 POL. THEORY 653, 663
(1994) (noting that in a “colonial or a postcolonial situation . . . the cultural representations of feminine
identity are as much nationalist political constructions as social ones”).
22. See, e.g., Caitlin Killian, The Other Side of the Veil: North African Women in France
Respond to the Headscarf Affair, 17 GENDER & SOC’Y 567, 575-86 (2003) (noting the full range of
reactions of Muslim women to the French headscarf law).
23. The wearing of the hijab by Muslim girls in Europe is, as concluded by Bhikhu Parekh:
a highly complex autonomous act intended both to remain within the tradition and to
challenge it, to accept the cultural inequality and to create a space for equality. To see it
merely as a symbol of their subordination, as many French feminists did, is to miss the
subtle dialectic of cultural contestation.
Bhikhu Parekh, A Varied Moral World, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 69, 73 (Joshua
Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
24. For a nuanced analysis of the practice of veiling in Muslim societies, see Nancy
Hirschmann, Eastern Veiling, Western Freedom?, 59 REV. POL. 461 (2001). See also Carolyn Evans,
The ‘Islamic Scarf’ in the European Court of Human Rights, 7 MELB. J. INT’L. L. 52, 71-72 (2006)
(noticing two contradictory stereotypes of Muslim women in debates concerning the Islamic headscarf,
one as a submissive victim of a “gender oppressive religion” needing rescue by the state, the other as an
aggressor and fundamentalist who imposes values upon the unwilling and who threatens to destabilize
the liberal, egalitarian order of the state).
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the public sphere (or, more accurately, in specific parts of the public sphere),
what are the reasons justifying this particular demarcation of spheres (as
opposed to others), and are these reasons reconcilable with a robust
conception of the right to religious freedom?25
It is to concerns such as these that we must now turn in more depth.
Before doing so, however, I wish to clarify that my intention in considering
these three grounds of limitation, albeit in somewhat cursory terms, is not to
suggest that valid arguments cannot be advanced in support of a law
prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. Rather, what I
wish to assert is that analysis of this issue under Article 18 alone fails to
capture what lies at the heart of the controversy. Viewing laws proscribing the
wearing of religious symbols solely in terms of individual rights (individuals
are free to practice their religion provided this does not cause harm to
others)26 obscures the collective religious and cultural implications of symbols
such as the Islamic headscarf. Members of different national, cultural, and
religious groups have differing national, cultural, and religious identities—that
is to say, collective identities—that must be carefully factored into interpreting
or analyzing rights claims of this kind. Indeed, this Article argues that what
gives rise to conflicts between differently situated subjects are not primarily
differences among individuals, but differences—and unequal treatment—
among groups.
Scholars of international human rights law are beginning to recognize
how the divergent claims and interests of majorities and minorities, and the
different conceptions of individual and collective goods from which they
arise, are inseparably related to individual claims of right. Correspondingly, it
is becoming apparent that the “liberal algebra”27 of rights regimes is unable to
resolve such conflicts without considering, at least at some point in the
analysis, different conceptions of collective goods in the historical context of
particular political communities.28 In order to illustrate the importance of the
collective aspects of claims to religious freedom, we need squarely to confront
a generally undertheorized and contested area of international human rights
25. One possible argument, for example, is that the state has different responsibilities in the
sphere of education and that children (at least at a certain age) have lesser rights in the matter than
adults. This appears, indeed, to be a significant part of the French defense of the rule. But the point
remains that any reason that may be advanced to justify this position will be controversial and contested
and that there is no obvious or easy answer as to how to demarcate the public and private spheres
consistently with a coherent theory of freedom of religion and belief.
26. Galeotti refers to this as the “naïve liberal view” under which the issue of the Islamic
headscarf “appears inexplicable”:
The naive liberal view conceives of toleration as the principle according to which
everyone should be free to follow his or her ideals and style of life as long as no harm is
done to anyone else. Headscarves do no harm to any third party, and the choice to wear
one for whatever reason rests in the proper domain of personal freedom. This simplistic
approach to the case suggests that toleration is the obvious solution, but, in doing so, it
disguises the raison d’être of the controversy.
GALEOTTI, supra note 2, at 118.
27. Jeremy Waldron, Toleration and Reasonableness, in THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN
DIVERSE SOCIETIES 13, 14 (Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 2003).
28. See, e.g., id. at 14-16, 23. For general discussion on the notion of “common” goods, see
WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 220 (2d ed. 2002)
(noting that communitarian critiques of liberalism conceive the “common good” in terms of a
“substantive conception of the good life which defines the community’s ‘way of life’”).
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law known broadly as “group rights.” In particular, we need to consider two
types of communal claims—the first of so-called “peoples” or “nations” and
the second of so-called “religious, cultural or linguistic minorities.”
Together these group claims point toward the need for a theory of value
pluralism in international law (whether “liberal” or otherwise) and away from
classical liberal theories premised exclusively on the idea of individual rights.
Indeed, it is only by including in the analysis these two sets of group rights
and considering their conceptual interrelationship to individual rights that the
issue of the wearing of religious symbols or attire becomes comprehensible,
and the need to move beyond traditional liberal accounts of human rights
becomes apparent. On this basis, the central argument of this Article is that
the need to accord public recognition of group differences and identities
requires us to reconsider two central tenets of the liberal rights tradition: first,
the idea that comprehensive conceptions of religious and moral value are
“private” matters to be excluded from the public sphere; and second, the idea
that religious freedom requires no more than noninterference with the
individual’s imagined sphere of liberty as opposed to public recognition of a
plurality of different religious and cultural groups and ways of life.
III. THE RIGHTS OF MAJORITY NATIONS
The primary subject of international law is the nation-state. Implicit in
this notion is the idea of a majority group with a distinct (as yet undefined)
identity. What are the implications of this background premise for the right to
freedom of religion or belief of differently situated groups inhabiting the same
state or territory? The argument in this Part develops in three stages. First, in
Section III.A, I show how attempts to accommodate religious diversity in
nation-states generate two conceptions of pluralism, one premised on the
liberal nondiscrimination principle and the other on a plurality of situated
subjects asserting collective claims of right. In recognition of this tension,
contemporary theorists have sought to combine these narratives in different
versions of “liberal nationalism,” which I describe in Section III.B. Finally,
while the formalism of the “liberal state” may obscure this fact, in Section
III.C, I show that such attempts illustrate the complex implications of the
tension between pluralism and nationalism for any theory of individual
toleration in international law.
Let us begin our consideration of these arguments with the first category
of group rights: the claims of “peoples” and “nations.” It is a basic axiom of
international law that “peoples” have a right to self-determination.29 It is also
29. The right to self-determination has been recognized in all the major international human
rights treaties and declarations, including the U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1(1);
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); and the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). It has
also been considered and applied in various cases in the International Court of Justice. See, e.g.,
Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 95 (June 30); Western Sahara, Advisory
Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-35 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21). In the opinion of many jurists and writers, self-
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well-known that what constitutes a “people” and what the norm of “selfdetermination” requires are two of the most controversial and essentially
contested questions in international legal theory. I do not intend to discuss
either question in detail here. Rather, my focus is on a less controversial
proposition, albeit one that is usually either assumed or overlooked in
discussions of this kind. Nevertheless, it is a proposition that I believe is
critical to our understanding of the nature of the problem that confronts us: the
notion that, however the identity of the international legal subject is
conceived, it will necessarily include contested conceptions of particular
collective goods such as issues of a common history, territory, language,
culture, and for present purposes, religion.
Before we can conceive of the concept of a minority group claiming
rights, we first need some preexisting conception of a majority group. Neither
of the concepts “majority” nor “minority” makes sense without the other. In
international law, the recognized majority group is the “nation” or “people,”
usually defined in historical terms and with respect to certain collective
notions of nationality, culture, and religion. At the same time, the proper
subject of international law is not the nation, but the state. 30 While most
existing states are constituted by different ethnicities, religious groups,
nationalities, and peoples, in contemporary liberal rights discourse it is tacitly
assumed that there is a general correspondence between nation and state—that
the political community is coterminous with a dominant majority ethnic,
religious, and cultural community. 31 In this sense, the relationship between
nation and state—or more precisely the idea that the central subject of
international law is the sovereign nation-state—is the “great unexamined
assumption of liberal thought.”32
There are important historical and theoretical explanations for this
assumption and for its relative quiescence in contemporary rights discourse.
For present purposes, I wish to focus on the supposed rationale for the nationstate. This, I believe, can be stated in rather simple terms: the nation-state
embodies the recognition that there is a morally significant connection
between human freedom and a collective cultural life. National selfdetermination is thus a “cultural right” in the sense that national, cultural, and
determination is not only a binding rule of international law, but enjoys the status of a peremptory norm
(jus cogens). See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 133-40
(1995).
30. See TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 43 (1983) (noting
that “it is not nations in the sense of ethnic communities that are associated within international society,
but ‘states’”).
31. See Will Kymlicka, Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in
CAN LIBERAL PLURALISM BE EXPORTED? WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN
EASTERN EUROPE 13, 20 (Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski eds., 2001) (arguing that liberal political
theorists have ignored the historical connection between liberal-democratic states and the “promotion of
a common national language and societal culture”) [hereinafter Kymlicka, Western Political Theory];
MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN AMERICAN 53 (1992) [hereinafter WALZER, WHAT IT
MEANS]. Walzer suggests that political theorists have simply assumed the national or ethnic
homogeneity of the communities about which they wrote: “Even liberal writers, ready enough to
acknowledge a plurality of interests, were strikingly unready for a plurality of cultures. One people
made one state.” Id.
32. JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM 123 (2000) [hereinafter GRAY, TWO FACES OF
LIBERALISM].
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religious communities seek and require not private but “public spheres” of
their own in order to flourish and, ultimately, to survive.33 The claim is not
only legal and political, whether in the form of the right of a nation to a state
or, as we shall see, of a minority to sub-state minority rights. The claim is also
ethical and cultural, in the form of a collective right to preserve the existence
of a unique social group. When these two claims are conjoined—when a
cultural or religious group asserts legal autonomy in the form of a state—
statehood becomes the means of enhancing or protecting cultural and religious
identities. By securing the public space of the state to preserve national
customs or traditions, the state therefore assumes a “cultural essence.”34
What I wish to suggest is that this cultural function of the nation-state
has particular importance for our understanding of the question of religious
freedom. 35 This is because the culture and historical traditions of national
groups have been shaped, to varying degrees, by particular religious
traditions. Virtually all national constitutions recognize a distinct relationship
between the state on the one hand, and religion in general, or one or more
religions or beliefs in particular, on the other.36 At the same time, constitutions
also recognize fundamental human rights norms, including the right to
freedom of religion or belief, the right to equality and nondiscrimination on
the basis of religion, and the right of religious minorities to practice their own
religion. The critical question then is whether the state is able to honor both
these sets of commitments and the potentially far-reaching conflicts to which
they give rise. Recognition of a special relationship between the state and a
particular religion may, for example, conflict in various ways with the
principle of nondiscrimination. Conversely, constitutional recognition of a
belief system of an antireligious or “secular” character may conflict with the
full protection of the right to freedom of religion. Is it possible, therefore, for
the state successfully both to recognize one or more religious traditions and
ensure respect for human rights?
A.

Two Concepts of Pluralism

The human rights literature on these questions distinguishes between
two conceptions or “models” of pluralism that seek to accommodate religious,

33. YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 8-9 (1993) (arguing that the “demand for a public
sphere in which the cultural aspects of national life come to the fore constitutes the essence of the right
to national self-determination”).
34. Yael Tamir, The Right to National Self-Determination, 58 SOC. RES. 565, 585 (1991).
35. For a comprehensive argument that freedom of religion should be “reconstructed” as a
special case of the right to culture and should thus be defined as a “minority rights requirement,” see
Gidon Sapir, Religion and State—A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 626-45
(1999).
36. For a review of the variety of religion/state relationships as expressed in national
constitutions, see Johan D. van der Vyver, Introduction: Legal Dimensions of Religious Human Rights:
Constitutional Texts, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES xi
(Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter LEGAL PERSPECTIVES]. Of course,
there are some notable exceptions, such as in the cases of the United States (where the constitution
merely enunciates norms of nonestablishment and free exercise without mentioning any specific
religion) and of the United Kingdom (which has no written constitution but has an established church).
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ethnic, and cultural diversity in democratic states.37 The first is based on the
so-called “nondiscrimination” principle, which derives from the way that
religious minorities are treated in liberal states. As Will Kymlicka explains:
In the sixteenth century, European states were being torn apart by conflict between
Catholics and Protestants over which religion should rule the land. These conflicts were
finally resolved, not by granting special rights to particular religious minorities, but by
separating church and state, and entrenching each’s individual freedom of religion.
Religious minorities are protected indirectly, by guaranteeing individual freedom of
worship, so that people can freely associate with other co-religionists, without fear of
state discrimination or disapproval.38

On this approach, members of religious groups are protected against
discrimination and prejudice, and they are free to maintain their religion as
they wish, consistent with the rights of others. This is the classical liberal
solution to the problem of how to reconcile rights-based conceptions of
individual freedom with genuine religious and cultural diversity. This is done
through commitment
in the strongest possible way to individual rights and, almost as a deduction from this, to
a rigorously neutral state, that is, a state without cultural or religious projects or, indeed,
any sort of collective goals beyond the personal freedom and the physical security,
welfare, and safety of its citizens.39

From this conception arise the two defining features of the liberal state:
first, the “privatization” of religion on the basis of a public/private distinction
that separates religion from the state (which may assume a variety of forms);
and second, in order to justify the first move, an assertion of a “neutral” public
sphere that seeks to maintain its neutrality through commitment to a scheme
of individual rights.
The idea of liberal neutrality can take a variety of forms depending on
how exactly the separation of religion from the public sphere is understood.
Of course, quite apart from conceptions of liberal neutrality, the general
relationship between religion and the state can itself assume many
configurations.40 As discussed later in Part IV, a neutral public sphere is a
precarious notion in the world of actually existing nation-states. 41 Indeed,
37. See, e.g., Nathan Glazer, Individual Rights Against Group Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES 123, 133-34 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1997); Michael Walzer, Pluralism: A Political
Perspective, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra, at 139, 140-44.
38. Will Kymlicka, Introduction to THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 37, at 1,
9 [hereinafter Kymlicka, Introduction].
39. Michael Walzer, Comment, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION 99, 99 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) [hereinafter Walzer, Comment].
40. See, e.g., W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative
Framework, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 36, at 1, 120-23 (classifying at least seven forms of
religion/state separation).
41. See, e.g., Alfred Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations,” J.
DEMOCRACY, 37, 43 (2000) (noting that five of the EU’s fifteen member states have established
churches and arguing that “[f]rom the viewpoint of empirical democratic practice . . . . secularism and
the separation of church and state have no inherent affinity with democracy”). Even within a modern
European nation-state such as Greece, the Greek Constitution is proclaimed in the name of the Holy
Trinity and affirms that the “dominant religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church.” See
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1993). As Francois Thual notes, “Caucasian,
Balkan, Greek, and Slav Orthodox Christianity has never known secularism based on the separation of
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given the specific history of the relationship between nationalism and the rise
of the secular liberal state, we might venture that for state neutrality to be
feasible, one may first need to assume either the existence of a strongly
homogeneous religious, cultural, and linguistic nation—and hence, the
absence (or denial) of the claims of significant religious, cultural, and
linguistic minorities—or to imagine an entirely immigrant society without a
majority nation—which, as we shall see, is problematic even in the one
exceptional case of the United States. Where either of these conditions is not
present, the liberal conception of church-state separation and strict neutrality
will be attenuated.
Unlike the nondiscrimination approach, there is a second conception of
pluralism, which is based on a different principle⎯that of a plurality of
collective subjects asserting claims of right. Its central premise is the use of
public measures to promote or protect the religious or cultural beliefs and
identities of specific majority and minority groups. In rejecting the imaginary
condition of cultural unity that underlies the individual rights approach (in
either its conservative or progressive guise),42 value pluralists argue that this
model constitutes a more robust form of nondiscrimination, as it requires the
state to provide the same sort of rights to minorities that are taken for granted
by the majority. Accordingly, the second approach allows for “a state
committed to the survival and flourishing of a particular nation, culture, or
religion, or of a (limited) set of nations, cultures, and religions—so long as the
basic rights of citizens who have different commitments or no such
commitments at all are protected.” 43 This is a permissive rather than a
determinative view. While the liberal commitments of the first approach may
apply at some times, at other times it will be necessary to “weigh the
importance of certain forms of uniform treatment [in accordance with a strong
theory of rights] against the importance of cultural survival and opt, where
necessary to protect cultural or religious integrity, for the logic of the second
approach.”44
The differences between these two conceptions of pluralism go to the
heart of the purpose of the state itself. For Nathan Glazer, the choice is
between
Church and State.” Francois Thual, Dans le monde orthodoxe, la religion sacralise la nation, et la
nation protège la religion, LE MONDE, Jan. 20, 1998, at 13.
42. Both conservative conceptions of national unity and progressive conceptions of universal
humanity are premised on certain background assumptions. As John Gray notes, “conservative critics of
liberalism see political order as serving the Old Right project of restoring, or instituting, an ‘integral’ or
‘organic’ culture, and their policy with regard to cultural minorities is one that forces on them
alternatives of assimilation or exclusion from the political order.” GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE,
supra note 6, at 138. This notion of “integralist nationalism” or “national unity” is what underlies
conservative conceptions of the liberal model as seen, for example, in states such as France. More
“progressive” conceptions seek not to assimilate or exclude cultural or religious diversity, but rather,
consistent with the Enlightenment-inspired nondiscrimination principle, seek to relegate such diversity
to the “private” sphere of voluntary association consistent with a scheme of individual rights as enforced
by a “neutral” state. This progressive conception of the liberal model is premised on a theory of history
that posits convergence on a “supposed future condition of the species in which cultural difference has
been marginalized in a universal civilization.” Id.
43. Walzer, Comment, supra note 39, at 99.
44. Id. at 100 (quoting Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM,
supra note 39, at 61) (alteration in original).
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forming a common national culture, or accepting the permanent existence of two or more
national cultures within a single state. . . . [T]he United States has firmly adopted the
former as its goal, and indeed it has had enormous success in integrating people of many
different races and religions into its common culture. Yet in many parts of the world this
sort of integration seems unthinkable, and minority groups are insistent on viewing the
larger state as a “confederation of groups.”45

In considering the different notions of pluralism that underlie these two
approaches, Walzer has distinguished between what he terms “New World”
and “Old World” pluralism. The success of the nondiscrimination principle in
the United States has been due, in Walzer’s view, to the fact that minorities
there are, by and large, immigrant groups (national minorities and indigenous
peoples remaining an important exception). New World pluralism is therefore
the result of religious and cultural diversity arising from voluntary decisions
of people to uproot themselves and join another society. 46 This can be
juxtaposed with Old World pluralism “where minorities are territorially
concentrated” and settled in historic territories that may, at some point in time,
have been “incorporated within the boundaries” of a larger state.47
This incorporation is usually involuntary, resulting from conquest, or colonization, or the
ceding of territory from one imperial power to another. Under these circumstances,
minorities are rarely satisfied with non-discrimination and eventual integration. What
they desire . . . is “national liberation”⎯that is, some form of collective self-government,
in order to ensure the continued development of their distinct culture.48

B.

Liberal Nationalism

There is a vast academic literature analyzing the relationship between
nationalism and liberalism and the seemingly irresolvable contradiction
between the nondiscrimination principle and recognition of the claims of
situated subjects, which I do not pursue here.49 It is important to note before
proceeding further, however, that a number of contemporary political
theorists—so-called “liberal nationalists”—have recognized the ambivalence
and, in general, silence of liberal theory towards the claims of majority and
minority groups and have sought to find pathways by which to combine
liberal individualist and pluralist group doctrines. Their work suggests the
need to take more seriously the tensions between liberal and pluralist
conceptions of rights such as freedom of religion or belief. Three positions, in
particular, have been advanced.

45. Kymlicka, Introduction, supra note 38, at 11.
46. For further discussion of the distinction between “Old World” and “New World”
pluralism and its impact on minority rights in the U.S. context, see infra note 107 and accompanying
text.
47. Kymlicka, Introduction, supra note 38, at 11.
48. Id.
49. I thus do not discuss in any depth the complex theoretical questions surrounding the idea
of the “nation-state” (for example, whether this is a “mono-national” state, or a state dominated by a
single “people,” or how exactly the notion of a “territorial-civic” state relates to the broader notion of a
nation-state). For a helpful overview and discussion of these more general questions, see CHAIM GANS,
THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM 3-96 (2003).
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Individual Autonomy and Encompassing Groups

The first position, most commonly associated with the work of Joseph
Raz, Avishai Margalit, and Yael Tamir, has been to draw a connection
between individual liberty and the need for a collective cultural life, which is
said to be possible only in a nation-state.50 The argument has two parts: first,
that nationality is morally significant because of its instrumental value for the
realization of certain social goods; and second, that nations may accordingly
claim a right of self-determination on consequentialist grounds. 51 This
approach encounters two difficulties, however: first, respect for liberal rights
extends only to national boundaries and thus violates the equal respect that
liberal theory supposedly accords to all individuals regardless of nationality;
and second, the notion of a “liberal national culture” is inevitably in tension
with the illiberal and exclusionary nature of both nationalism and the nationstate. 52 In the case of a largely “New World” immigrant society like the
United States, this second difficulty is not obviously apparent. But at times of
national emergency or in response to the increasing power or size of religious
or ethnic majorities or minorities, the latent tension between liberalism and
nationalism becomes exposed.53
2.

Democratic Theory and National Self-Determination

The second approach has been to try to link democratic consent theory
to national self-determination. On this view, the rights of nations can be
derived from the rights of individuals: the democratic right of individuals to
be governed by a government of their choosing is best realized through a right
of national groups to statehood. 54 For nationalism to be consistent with
consent theory, however, liberal voluntarist demands for separation by regions
50. The ability to express cultural preferences—an important aspect of individual liberty—is
seen as inextricably linked to “encompassing groups,” especially nations. Individuals therefore have an
interest in being members of nation-states because it is only the state that can ensure cultural expression
through, for example, national holidays, languages, symbols, or myths. TAMIR, supra note 33, at 85.
51. The need of individuals to live in encompassing groups justifies political legitimacy
including matters of territory and citizenship and “makes it reasonable to let the encompassing group
that forms a substantial majority in a territory have the right to determine whether that territory shall
form an independent state in order to protect the culture and self-respect of the group.” Avishai Margalit
& Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439, 457 (1990). The philosophical foundations
of this argument can be found in JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986), and AVISHAI
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996).
52. OMAR DAHBOUR, ILLUSION OF THE PEOPLES: A CRITIQUE OF NATIONAL SELFDETERMINATION 199 (2003). The liberal nation-state that successfully combines liberal and national
values would (i) “have a right of exclusion in terms of citizenship—but only on the condition that all
other nationalities had at least the right to states of their own; and (ii) accord all persons already present
in the nation-state equal rights, including national minorities.” Id. at 199 (discussing Tamir, supra note
33). As Dahbour notes, however, neither of these conditions seem consistent with the idea of a nationstate created to embody a particular national culture. Id.
53. The classic example in the American context is the Japanese Relocation Cases of the
1940s from which emerged the “compelling state interest” doctrine (“there the state interest deemed
‘compelling’ was ‘self-preservation of a nation at a time of war’”). Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 124 (1976) (discussing Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), and related cases in terms of the unwillingness of the courts to recognize social groups
under the “highly individualistic” nondiscrimination principle).
54. See Harry Beran, Self-Determination: A Philosophical Perspective, in SELFDETERMINATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 23, 25-31 (W.J. Allan Macartney ed., 1988).
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or minority groups into separate states (secession) must take precedence over
existing nationalist demands to maintain the unity of nation-states. But if this
is the case, it is difficult to see how a liberal democratic theory of group selfdetermination differs in practical terms from a nationalist theory of
communitarian attribution of membership on the basis of ascribed national
characteristics. Furthermore, if the “self” in self-determination is the “nation,”
this approach contradicts and ultimately renders incoherent the international
legal doctrine of state sovereignty. Once the essentially contested concept of a
“nation” is decided on a liberal democratic voluntarist basis, the sovereignty
of existing states (especially the territorial integrity of states comprising
multiple nationalities) will come indelibly under attack. 55 The strong
correlation of Western “liberal” states to a dominant majority nation or people
obscures the critical nature of this challenge to theories of sovereignty and
international law in general.
3.

Individual Identity and Political Community

Finally the third approach, often associated with the work of Michael
Walzer, has been to view national self-determination not within an essentially
individualistic conception of political legitimacy but within a communitarian
conception. The nation-state is seen as the “ideal form that a community must
take in order to create the kind of moral responsibility between its members
that would result in a more egalitarian society.”56 This form of political (as
opposed to moral) 57 communitarianism is most concerned with the
relationship between the state, on the one hand, and communal norms and
cultures on the other. What is at issue, therefore, is whether a liberal
conception of voluntary association is a sufficient basis for political
community or whether some other, nonliberal conception may be required as a
form of communitarian “corrective” within the liberal state.58 Walzer has thus
sought to combine

55. Thus, “sovereignty” is part of the nationalist conception of political autonomy only when
it is equivalent to the sovereignty of nation-states, not of states in general. Id. at 28. As David Miller
argues, a consensual justification of self-determination leads to unstable and anarchic outcomes. On this
approach, there is no way of ensuring stable and secure boundaries when changes in the way individuals
view their political loyalties could lead to continual rearrangements of state sovereignties and territories.
David Miller, In Defence of Nationality, 10 J. APPLIED PHIL. 3, 12 (1993).
56. DAHBOUR, supra note 52, at 201 (emphasis added). This is because it is only the shared
sense of national identity that creates an ethical imperative to sacrifice for others, for example, in
relation to military service or redistributive taxation. See DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 96 (1995).
57. “Moral” communitarianism is concerned primarily with the role of communities in
determining the moral roles and conduct of individuals. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2007); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE (1982); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (1989).
Walzer has argued that the long-standing debate between liberals and communitarians has centered on
the psychological bases of morality. For political philosophy, however, “[t]he central issue is . . . not the
constitution of the self but the connection of constituted selves, the pattern of social relations.” Michael
Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 21 (1990).
58. Walzer describes liberalism as a “theory of relationship, which has voluntary association
at its center and which understands voluntariness as the right of rupture or withdrawal.” Thus, “insofar
as liberalism tends toward instability and dissociation, it requires periodic communitarian correction.”
Walzer, supra note 57, at 21.
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adherence to liberal norms of individual rights with a view of communities as providing
the basis for these rights through the cultivation of their own distinct characters
separately from those of others. While, within a community, liberal rights may be
legitimate, between communities, such rights cannot directly apply. It is the pursuit of an
international community of separate but equal nation-states that constitutes the only
means of eventually ensuring the fullest possible adherence to liberal rights.59

In considering the relative virtues of these three conceptions of liberal
nationalism, we can see that the first and third versions are rather close; their
differences reflect different vantage points from which to consider the same
set of questions. While the first version of Raz, Margalit, and Tamir
emphasizes the importance of encompassing groups to individual freedom,
Walzer’s third version emphasizes the importance of individual
(ethnocultural) identity to communal autonomy and solidarity. Both may be
regarded as perfectionist theories as they regard political freedom not
independently from the good, but as aspects of it. In these two versions we see
two liberal conceptions of “value pluralism”—the former construing
individual freedom in terms of social forms and identities, the latter construing
communal freedom in terms of individual forms and identities.60
C.

Pluralism and Nationalism

However we view the merits of these three accounts, it is critical to note
that any attempt to combine liberal individualist and pluralist group doctrines
will contain an ineradicably communitarian, nonliberal element in
justifications of the nation-state, including the liberal nation-state. The
formalism of liberal depictions of the “state” in purely individualistic terms—
the state as a collection of unsituated abstract individuals—obscures this
group-based dimension of the primary subject of international law.
Furthermore, the latent ambiguities in the concept of the nation-state suggest
that the term “nationalism” describes in fact not one, but two ideas: first, a
type of nationalism that is statist and territorial-civic, and second, a type that
is ethnocultural.
Statist nationalism views the political values of the state as superior to
the national culture, which, if considered relevant at all, is assumed to be
homogeneous (along the lines of Mill’s “common sympathies”61) and to be in
59. DAHBOUR, supra note 52, at 203.
60. To critics of liberal nationalism, however, the attempt to view the nation-state consistently
with liberal values remains internally inconsistent and incoherent. Dahbour points to three
contradictions: (i) liberal nationalism attempts to combine individual liberty with an authoritarian notion
of the importance of the state in the creation of national cultures; (ii) there is a basic contradiction
between voluntary association and the communalist nature of nationalist movements and states; and (iii)
liberal nationalism gives rise to conflicting tendencies between a liberal, egalitarian conception of justice
and a particularist notion of national independence and identity. Id. at 204-06.
61. In his The Law of Peoples, Rawls cites J.S. Mill for the idea that nationality describes a
“people’s culture”:
This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is
the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, community of
religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the
strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of national history, and
consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and
regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. None of these circumstances,
however, are necessarily sufficient by themselves.
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service of the political values of the state. In terms of the relationship between
specific religious and cultural groups on the one hand, and the legal and
political spheres of the state on the other, this is achieved through the
public/private divide and thus the privatization and legal disestablishment of
religious and cultural traditions. Ethnocultural nationalism, by contrast, views
national culture(s) as superior or prior to the state, which, in turn, is valued
merely as the instrumental means for preserving the former. This is because
“members of groups sharing a common history[, religion,] and societal culture
have a fundamental, morally significant interest in adhering to their [religion
and] culture and in sustaining [them] across generations.”62
Hans Kohn first made this distinction in the literature on nationalism
after the Second World War. He characterized statist, territorial-civic
nationalism as “predominantly a political movement to limit governmental
power and to secure civic rights” which developed during the Enlightenment
mainly in the “advanced” countries of the West: England, the United States,
and France.63 Conversely, “ethnocultural nationalism was characteristic of less
advanced countries, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe (but in Spain and
Ireland)” which were said to be inspired not by the “legal and rational concept
of citizenship” but by “imagination and emotions, and by the unconscious
development of the Volk and its primordial and atavistic spirit.”64 On the first
view, nationalism is subjective, individualistic, and voluntarist: “individuals
give themselves a state, and the state is what binds together the nation . . . .
[T]hat concept of nation is subjective since it emphasizes the will of
individuals. And it is individualistic since the nation is nothing over and above
willing individuals.”65 On the second view, however, nationalism is objective,
collectivist, and lacks individual choice:
[It] is based on a conception of the nation as the product of objective facts pertaining to
social life. These facts are that members of the nation share a common language, culture
and tradition. In this type of nationalism, the nation exists prior to the state. It is also a
collective that transcends and is prior to the individuals of which it consists.66

The divergence between these two types of nationalism—and between
their corresponding notions of how best to accommodate religious, ethnic, and
cultural diversity in democratic states—goes to the heart of my argument.67
The excessive formalism of the first approach occludes from rights discourse
the very source of controversy in cases such as the prescribing of the wearing
of religious symbols in public schools: the conflicting claims of a majority to
a particular national culture of its own and of minorities to public recognition
of their collective religious and cultural identities and practices. It is to these
issues which we must now turn.
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 23 (1999) (quoting John Stuart Mill).
62. GANS, supra note 49, at 7.
63. HANS KOHN, NATIONALISM: ITS MEANING AND HISTORY 29-30 (1955).
64. GANS, supra note 49, at 8.
65. Michael Seymour et al., Introduction: Questioning the Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy, in
RETHINKING NATIONALISM 1, 2-3 (Jocelyne Couture et al. eds., 1998).
66. GANS, supra note 49, at 9.
67. For example, these two views generate competing approaches to interpreting the religion
clauses of the First Amendment. See infra Section IV.D.

2008]

Suspect Symbols
IV.

21

THE NATION-STATE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

In order to illustrate the implications of these tensions and the competing
conceptions of pluralism they generate for our understanding of religious
freedom as an international human right, let us briefly consider how laws
proscribing the wearing of religious symbols would be regarded in four
different nation-states, each with their own unique conceptions and histories
of liberal nationalism: France, Turkey, Germany, and the United States.
A.

The French Affaire du Foulard and Laïcité

I have already suggested that viewing the recent affaire du foulard solely
in terms of the nondiscrimination principle fails to explain why this has
become such an intractable question in France. The wearing of a religious
symbol or attire is an obvious manifestation of religious belief and is thus
protected by the right to religious freedom. Furthermore, as we have seen,
none of the recognized grounds of limitation provide convincing reasons for
the state to limit the right in this case. How then can we explain the
controversy and the fact that Muslim girls wearing a covering over their hair
in public schools has been such a serious social and political problem in
France?68 At the deepest level the answer lies, I believe, in the French idea of
laïcité and the fact that Islam, as symbolized by the headscarf, is seen through
the lens of French nationalism (from both the left and right) as a threat to the
secular character of the Republic.
Laïcité is an idea that describes a specific conception of the publicprivate divide and state “neutrality” in strictly secular terms.69 It also defines
the collective, public identity of the French nation. The French national
personality is embodied in the secular, rational Jacobin republic that was
founded out of the French Revolution. 70 This collective personality is the
precondition of French citizenship. The collective narratives that define what
68. In France, a 1992 poll showed that two-thirds of the population feared the presence of
Islam in that country. See HARGREAVES, supra note 16, at 119. I do not consider in my analysis obvious
socio-political factors such as the challenges posed by and effects of the large inflow of formerly
colonized Muslim workers into France (especially from Algeria and Morocco), of France’s ceding
national autonomy to the European Union, or of the various effects of the exigencies of the global
economy on French national life.
69. Article 2 of the 1958 French Constitution states that “France is a Republic that is
indivisible, laïque, democratic, and social. It shall ensure the equality before the law of all of its citizens,
without distinction as to origin, race, or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.” 1958 CONST. art. 2. (Fr.).
70. Galeotti attributes the neutrality of the public sphere as articulated in the ideal of the
secular state in France to the historical tradition of “the Enlightenment, Rousseau, [and] the Jacobin state
with the republican tradition revisited.” GALEOTTI, supra note 2, at 123. The French Revolution
denounced religious intolerance and attacked ecclesiastical power under the banner of “humanity.” As
explained by Talal Asad:
The political oratory and pamphleteering of the Revolution created a public space that
was national in its focus and ambition. By then, of course, the essence of religion had
come to be generally defined as consisting essentially of personal belief so that the
Church as a public body appeared simply as a rival for political authority. The result was
nearly a century of bitter conflict between the state and its internal competitor for
sovereignty, a conflict finally resolved under the Third Republic that was dedicated to a
civilizing mission in the name of the Revolutionary ideals of humanity and progress.
Talal Asad, Keynote Address at the Beirut Conference on Public Spheres: Reflections on Laïcité and the
Public Sphere 1 (Oct. 22-24, 2004), http://www.ssrc.org/publications/items/v5n3/index.html.
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it means to “be French” and the practices that they authorize construct French
citizens as carriers of a secular heritage that, in the words of Talal Asad,
cannot be de-essentialized. This view, shared by left, center, and right, rejects the notion
that the citizen is identical only with himself or herself, that he or she therefore
essentially represents an abstract quantity that can be separated from his or her social
identity, added up and then divided into groups that have only numerical value.71

Given the strength of this national identity, both the conservative and
progressive responses to the issue of the wearing of the Islamic headscarf are
broadly predictable. For both camps, the perceived need for a law proscribing
the hijab in public schools derives from the majority’s claim to realize its
national identity (laïcité) in the public sphere of the state—i.e., the majority’s
right to be French in their own country. For the right, the majority has the
right to protect its distinctive national character against the influence of
minority difference through a conception of integralist nationalism.72 Under
this view, minorities must either assimilate and accept the requirements of
French citizenship (and thus ultimately cease to belong to a distinct minority
group) or, if “inassimilable” (which, in France, is a term usually applied to
members of North African Muslim communities73), be encouraged or required
to leave the country once their labor is no longer needed.
For the left, the question is viewed as one of neither assimilation nor
exclusion. Rather, laïcité is understood as a doctrine of toleration defined in
terms of the public-private divide and state neutrality. This requires the state
not to interfere in individual choices regarding the conception of the good in
the private realm of civil society (and wearing the headscarf clearly belongs to
this sphere). In the public sphere, however, laïcité requires the state to be
neutral, blind, and indifferent to diversity in order to honor the
nondiscrimination principle and treat everyone equally. Of course, what
“difference-blind” neutrality actually requires in this context is contested. A
weak form would require officials to disregard differences as the proper
grounds of action, whereas a stronger form would require all differences to be
kept out of the public sphere.74 Given that the public school system is the
71. TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 176
(2003) (emphasis removed).
72. As Jean Le Pen stated in 1982, “[w]e not only have the right but the duty to defend our
national personality . . . and we too have our right to be different.” Id. at 175-76. For a discussion of the
idea of “integralist nationalism,” see supra note 42.
73. “[M]ore than half the inhabitants of French prisons are young Muslims of North African
origin.” Asad, supra note 70, at 1 n.2.
74. As noted by Galeotti, however, this notion of state neutrality is open to at least two
objections:
First, how can public officials and authorities draw the line between public statements
and private values, given that they are also supposed to be neutral and blind to
differences? Neutrality seems to preclude an evaluation of the content of differences. . . .
The result is that the prohibition of the headscarf in school for the sake of neutrality
would derive from an argument which infringes the very principle of neutrality. Second,
not all behavior which can be classified as a public statement receives the same
treatment.
GALEOTTI, supra note 2, at 126. Galeotti contrasts a statement of fashion—for example, “punk style”—
that is accepted in French schools even though it is an “ostentatious” symbol in the public sphere, with a
manifestation of religion—the Islamic veil—that is not. The difference here is between fashion or
lifestyle, on the one hand, and a religiously-inspired practice on the other. Again, state officials are
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primary means by which the civic spirit of future secular citizens of the
Republic is to be fostered, the prohibition of all religious symbols is a
“reaffirmation of the boundaries of the secularized public sphere against any
religious interference.”75 This is not regarded as intolerance by the majority,
but rather as a “limit to liberal tolerance in order to preserve the neutrality of
the public school and the equality of the students as would-be citizens, beside
and beyond any particular memberships.”76
The difficulty with this understanding of liberal toleration is that it
defines neutrality in terms of the “essential” collective identity of the majority,
while denying public recognition of the “essential” collective identities of
minorities. As Asad argues:
To insist in this context that Muslim groups must not be defined in terms they regard as
essential to themselves is in effect to demand that they can and should shed the narratives
and practices they take to be necessary to their lives as Muslims. The crucial difference
between the “majority” and “minorities” is, of course, that the majority effectively claims
the French state as its national state. In other words, to the extent that “France” embodies
the Jacobin narrative, it essentially represents the Christian and post-Christian citizens
who are constituted by it.77

Even the progressive understanding fails, then, to resolve the tension
between ensuring respect for individuals and fostering the conditions that will
nurture collective ways of life. Religious and cultural diversity will indeed be
respected but only on terms that conform to the majority’s conception of the
good. The French state’s right to defend its essential or “inviolable” secular
personality thus trumps the right to freedom of religion or belief to the extent
that the latter is interpreted to conflict with the former.
As already noted, this raises doubts about the specific meaning of the
concept of neutrality employed here. 78 The public-private divide does not
require the majority of French citizens to change their way of life or
manifestation of religious beliefs. For growing numbers of North African
Muslims in France, however, as for many Pakistanis in Britain and Turks in
Germany, neutrality means accepting alien notions of privatization and
disestablishment of Islam in ways that can violate the very essence of their
religious convictions and way of life.79 The real problem, as Asad notes, is

deciding what constitutes fashion and what constitutes religion (i.e., assessing the meaning and validity
within the public sphere of private concerns, commitments, and sentiments). In this sense, the public
sphere cannot be said to be “neutral” between secular and religious expression. Id.
75. Id. at 123.
76. Id. at 123-24.
77. ASAD, supra note 71, at 175. “If the wearer regards the veil as her religious duty, it
becomes an integral part of herself . . . not a sign that can be shed at will but part of a presence that
indexes an embodied doctrine.” Asad, supra note 70, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
78. As Galeotti notes, “[b]efore the headscarf case broke out, no one was even aware of
whether religious symbols were present in school or not. This might suggest that, as the critics of
liberalism have remarked, neutrality is not so neutral after all, and the secular state not so thoroughly
secularized.” GALEOTTI, supra note 2, at 124. For discussion of the French position on minority rights
issues in particular, see infra note 113.
79. I use the term “disestablishment,” here, in the general sense that legal and political
neutrality “demands the legal disestablishment of any common culture, in so far as that incorporates—as
inevitably it must—specific conceptions of the virtues, and of the good life.” GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S
WAKE, supra note 6, at 78.
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that it is the attachment to Islam that many believe commits Muslims to values
that challenge the modern secular state.
The de-essentialization of Islam is paradigmatic for all thinking about the assimilation of
non-European peoples to European civilization. The idea that people’s historical
experience is inessential to them, that it can be shed at will, makes it possible to argue
more strongly for the Enlightenment’s claim to universality: Muslims, as members of the
abstract category “humans,” can be assimilated or (as some recent theorists put it)
“translated” into a global (“European”) civilization once they have divested themselves
of what many of them regard (mistakenly) as essential to themselves. The belief that
human beings can be separated from their histories and traditions makes it possible to
urge a Europeanization of the Islamic world. And by the same logic, it underlies the
belief that the assimilation to Europe’s civilization of Muslim immigrants who are—for
good or for ill—already in European states is necessary and desirable.80

There is, however, a further set of concerns with the French notion of
laïcité and state neutrality. This involves a deeper question of how European
identity and experience have evolved within a Christian, and later
Enlightenment, narrative and how this identity has acquired a distinctive
“civilizational character.” This identity has been constructed, at least in part,
in opposition to what is today commonly called “Islamic civilization.”81 I do
not intend to pursue this complex series of arguments further here other than
to suggest that, despite the strongly secular character of the state, the doctrine
of laïcité is by no means uniformly applied in France, either as regards
specific religions or religion in general. (Of course, much of my point would
remain even if it were uniformly applied.)
In Christian and Jewish schools across the country, crosses and
yarmulkes can be worn, and religious texts are taught. Not only are the
graduates of these schools regarded as “good French citizens,” the schools
themselves are subsidized by the state as “private establishments under
contract to the government.”82 In the region of Alsace-Moselle, the state pays
the salaries of priests, pastors, and rabbis and owns all church property.83 The
Roman Catholic Church also occupies a special position according to the
modus vivendi put in place from 1922 to 1924 between France and the Holy
See that allows the Republic to recognize “diocesan associations” within the
framework of the Act of 1905 on the Separation of the Churches and the

80. Id. at 169-70.
81. See, e.g., HUGH TREVOR-ROPER, THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN EUROPE (1965) (noting, for
example, that although Spain is geographically part of Europe, Arab Spain in medieval times is seen as
being “outside Europe” despite the complex relationships and exchanges between Muslims, Christians,
and Jews in the Iberian peninsula during that period).
82. Asad, supra note 70, at 8.
83. The Stasi Report discusses the historical reasons for this exception to the principle of
laïcité and the 1905 Law and suggests that the arrangement be retained on the ground that it is part of a
“regional identity” and that the people in the area are especially attached to them. See LAÏCITÉ ET
RÉPUBLIQUE, COMMISSION PRÉSIDÉE PAR BERNARD STASI [LAÏCITÉ AND THE REPUBLIC: COMMISSION
PRESIDED BY BERNARD STASI] 113 (2004).
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State.84 There are many other examples of state support and reinforcement of
individual attachment to religious communities.85
France, in reality, is not the neutral, secular state envisioned under the
nondiscrimination principle in which individual citizens with universal rights
engage in strictly rational discourse in the public sphere. French citizens have
particular rights by virtue of their belonging to certain, predominantly
Christian, religious groups and the power to assert those rights in the public
sphere. With some caution then, we may draw two conclusions regarding
religious freedom in the country. The first is that any exception to the general
rule of laïcité will be determined by the majority—i.e., by the class of French
citizens whose collective identity is either Christian or post-Christian—
typically out of deference to the historical relationship between the nation and
its dominant religion.86 The second is that this exercise of national sovereignty
will be neutral neither towards religion in general, nor to minority religions
such as Islam in particular. So-called “Judeo-Christian” values will remain as
the historical and conceptual background—the now invisible baseline—for
France’s secular public sphere and will contribute to shaping a uniquely
French form of liberal nationalism.
B.

Turkish Secularism

Having considered the case of France in some detail, let me now turn
more briefly to the three nation-states of Turkey, Germany, and the United
States. I do so not to provide a comprehensive treatment of the question of the
wearing of religious symbols in public schools in these countries, but rather to
illustrate how different histories and understandings of the relationship
between nation and state will lead to different conceptions of the right to
religious freedom. In the case of Turkey, I wish to suggest two broad
similarities and one major difference with the French case. The first similarity
is that in Turkey there is a strongly homogenous, religiously and culturally
defined majority nation. The second similarity is that, since its founding by
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a “modern” Western-style state out of what
remained of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has been a republic with a strongly
laicist tradition. In this respect, French and Turkish secularism are broadly
similar, although with obvious historical and constitutional differences, and
both have broadly similar justifications. The major difference, however, is that
the struggle in Turkey is not between majority and minority groups but within
the majority itself.
84. Section 1 of the Act provides that the “Republic shall ensure freedom of conscience. It
shall guarantee free participation in religious worship, subject only to the restrictions laid down
hereinafter in the interest of public order.” Law on the Separation of Churches and State of Dec. 9, 1905,
Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 1905, p. 7205.
85. Chaplains in the army, schools, prisons, and hospitals are provided and paid for by the
state. Jewish and Islamic funerary rites are permitted in public cemeteries owned and operated by the
state. Under a 1987 law, gifts to religious associations that provide public services benefit from tax
concessions. See Asad, supra note 70, at 8.
86. Id. at 9 (“Varieties of remembered religious history, of perceived political threat and
opportunity, define the sensibilities underpinning secular citizenship and national belonging in a modern
state. The sensibilities are not always secure, they are rarely free of contradictions, and they are
sometimes fragile. But they make for qualitatively different forms of secularism.”).
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Turkey, like France, has a law regulating dress in public schools and
universities. 87 In 1988, fearing a backlash amongst religious middle-class
Turks, which make up its support base, the center-right government amended
the law to allow wearing the veil for reasons of religious belief in public
schools and universities. The following year, the Constitutional Court
annulled that amendment, “on the grounds that it was a breach of the principle
of secularism and threatened the unity of the state, security and public
order.” 88 That decision, and the continued validity of the law, were
subsequently confirmed in November 2004 by the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights, which held in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey that
the law did not violate Article 9 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).89
The Şahin case involved a medical student at the University of Istanbul
who was denied enrollment on the grounds that she was wearing the Islamic
headscarf. The applicant came from a traditional family of practicing Muslims
and regarded it as her religious duty to wear the headscarf. The Court accepted
that the regulations at issue interfered with her right to manifest her religion
under Article 9(1) but held that they constituted a valid limitation under
Article 9(2) because, as they pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the
“rights and freedoms of others” and “public order,” they could be regarded as
“necessary in a democratic society.”90 This was especially the case given the
margin of appreciation left to Contracting States. 91 The “necessity” of the
interference was held to be based on two principles—secularism and
equality—which reinforced each other. The Turkish constitutional principle of
87. Since the earliest days of the Republic, Turkey has had laws and decrees requiring
“contemporary costume” in the public sphere. Atatürk himself signed a 1923 decree on dress and the
Hat Law of 1925, and the Law Relating to Prohibited Garments of 1934 required religious clothing not
to be worn outside of times of worship and laid down dress guidelines for students and civil servants.
Article 6 of the Regulation Concerning the Dress of Students and Staff in Schools under
the Ministry of National Education and Other Ministries No. 8/3349 of July 22, 1981, as
amended on November 26, 1982, requires that students dress according to the code laid
down for civil servants. In universities, this code is administered by the HEC [Higher
Education Council].
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MEMORANDUM TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH’S
CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN HIGHER EDUCATION, AND ACCESS TO HIGHER
EDUCATION FOR WOMEN WHO WEAR THE HEADSCARF 27 (2007), available at
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/turkey/2004/ (also observing that since 1997, the HEC has forbidden
women wearing closefitting headscarves from studying or teaching in higher education).
88. Id. Despite some uncertainty on the strict legal position during the 1990s, at least since a
1997 military ultimatum delivered to the government at a meeting of the National Security Council, the
headscarf ban has been widely enforced both inside and outside universities.
89. Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
90. Id. ¶¶ 100-23.
91. The doctrine of a “margin of appreciation” is an interpretive principle designed to balance
a state’s sovereignty with the need to ensure observance of the Convention and thereby avoid damaging
confrontations between the European Court of Human Rights and Contracting Parties. It is based on the
idea that the primary responsibility for the implementation of the Convention lies with the parties
themselves and thus encompasses a discretion afforded by the Court to member states to employ varying
national standards of conventional protections. See R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in
THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 123 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al.
eds.,1993); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 843, 850 (1999) (arguing that the European Court of Human Rights grants a
wide margin of appreciation to majority-dominated national institutions as opposed to “democratically
challenged” minorities).
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secularism was held to be necessary for the protection of the democratic
system in Turkey.92 The principle of gender equality recognized in both the
Turkish constitution and the ECHR provided a further justification.
Unsurprisingly, the decision has been criticized for uncritically endorsing
religious intolerance, tacitly relying on a paternalistic and static conception of
gender equality, and advancing a weak conception of religious freedom.93
In order adequately to explain both the Turkish position and the decision
of the European Court, we need to note a major difference with the French
case. In Turkey, it is not a marginalized or distinct religious or cultural
minority seeking public recognition of their differences from the majority.
The struggle here is not between competing majority and minority notions of
collective goods as it is in the affaire du foulard (majority laïcité and minority
Islam) or in a case such as Kokkinakis v. Greece (majority Greek Orthodoxy
and minority beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses).94 Here, the struggle is within the
majority nation itself over two competing conceptions of the collective good,
one religious (Islam) and the other secular (Turkish republicanism or
Kemalism).95 A closer parallel in the French case would be if a conservative
Catholic student seeking to wear a Christian crucifix challenged the French
law proscribing the display of religious symbols in public schools.
Conversely, a closer parallel in Turkey to the French case would be a
challenge by the Kurdish minority to laws dating back to Atatürk restricting
the teaching of the Kurdish language or prohibiting the very existence of
Kurdish schools and associations (i.e., laws requiring all Turkish citizens—the

92. Viewing the regulations as intended to preserve “pluralism in the university,” the Court
pointed in particular to “extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a
whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts.” Şahin, App.
No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 109.
93. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 24, at 61-71; Ward, supra note 5. These criticisms were also
powerfully expressed in the dissenting judgment of Judge Tulkens who criticized the majority for
refusing to allow Ms. Şahin to act in accordance with her personal choice on the basis of an essentialized
and unexamined set of assumptions regarding the “connection between the ban and sexual equality.”
Şahin, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 12 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
94. For discussion on the relationship in Kokkinakis between individual rights and competing
conceptions of collective goods, see Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes, supra note 15.
95. The conflict is of course more complex than this simple opposition would suggest. As
Murat Akan suggests, the Kemalism/Islam opposition is actually a “political dichotomy representing an
elite conflict.” Murat Akan, Contextualizing Multiculturalism, 32 STUD. IN COMP. INT’L DEV. 57, 71
(2003). Secular elites in Turkey have traditionally sought to use and control Islam in utilitarian terms to
“bind the majority to the nation-building project.” Id. Article 24 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution
provides that “teaching and education in religion and morals is conducted under the guidance of the
state.” TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [Constitution] art. 24 (Turk.). Founded in 1924, the Ministry
of Religious Affairs has the authority to instruct citizens on “correct Islamic practices” in the face of the
divergent interpretations and local practices of Islamic sects. Akan, supra, at 70. Christian and Jewish
minorities have largely been left outside of this process. In this respect, Turkish secularism does not
entail a mutually exclusive sphere separate from Islam. The founding elite made religion subject to the
Republican state in order both to build a uniform nation-state and to eliminate religion as a rival
autonomous source of legitimacy. In the 1980s, however, “the monopoly of the Kemalist state elite on
capital and political power was challenged by a rising Islamist elite” which made a “counter-claim on
the very religious sphere which the republicans have striven to control and monopolize as a source of
legitimacy.” Id. at 71. The conflict, in other words, is over the locus of Islam as a source of political
legitimacy as between different elite groups.
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majority and minorities—to speak Turkish and attend Turkish public
schools).96
My point is that the rationale for the nondiscrimination principle derives
from the type of conflict we see in the Turkish case—the conflict between the
religious and secular spheres set against a background of broadly assumed
cultural and religious unity—and proposes a solution to that conflict based on
the twin principles of a public-private divide and state neutrality. We can see
this in the endorsement, albeit in different ways, by the European Court and
the Turkish Constitutional Court of the principles of secularism and equality.97
In a state such as France this is relatively unproblematic, at least among the
French majority. Laïcité is today well entrenched after centuries of struggle
between religious and secular forces within the French nation. The ideas of
religious belief as a “personal” matter in the private sphere and secular
rationality in the public sphere are now part of the national collective
identity. 98 In Turkey, however, Kemalism is less securely anchored in a
majority nation that is overwhelmingly Muslim and that has a different
historical understanding of the public-private divide. In both cases, however,
the real dispute is over how the two principles are to be interpreted in contrast
to the two more extreme or “nonliberal” positions of secular republicanism on
the one hand and religious establishment on the other. In this sense, the liberal
nondiscrimination principle represents one means of seeking to ensure the
peaceful coexistence in one nation of two values: the religious and the secular.
As between these two values, the nondiscrimination principle should therefore
be understood as a form of value pluralism.
Both the affaire du foulard and my example of Kurdish minority rights
claims in Turkey, however, reveal a deeper sense in which the liberal
approach is insufficiently pluralist. The conflict is not between two values (the
secular and the religious) within one religious and cultural group, but rather
between different understandings of how to reconcile these values as between
two or more religious and cultural groups—between, that is, the collective
conceptions of the good and the ways of life of two or more such groups. The
rationale for the move to some form of “group-based pluralism” becomes
evident in response to this latter conflict. In order to illustrate this, let us
consider the case of Germany.
96. See Dilek Kurban, Unravelling a Trade-Off: Reconciling Minority Rights and Full
Citizenship in Turkey, 4 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 341 (2004).
97. These principles have even been invoked by both the Turkish and European courts to
justify the dissolution of the Islamist Turkish Welfare Party. See Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v.
Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 267 (2003) (upholding the
dissolution as compatible with the ECHR despite the Refah Party being in government at the time, its
leader being the prime minister, and the party having 4.3 million members). As I argue below, however,
the Court’s use of the margin of appreciation in order to accommodate the plurality of conceptions of
liberal nationalism that characterize European (i.e., non-Muslim) nation-states suggests a tacit move
from a liberal towards a value pluralist approach.
98. In discussing Rousseau’s conception of the relationship between religion and citizenship,
for example, McConnell suggests that “Rousseau envisioned a society of much deeper and thicker
solidarity, making difference of religion—or even deep commitment to religion as a locus of truth and
loyalty—a threat.” Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 90, 98 (Nancy L.
Rosenblum ed., 2000).
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German Cooperationism

Unlike in France and Turkey, there is no rigid separation of church and
state in Germany. 99 The constitution is based instead on a cooperationist
model of “religious freedom, tolerance and the right to a religious
education.”100 Against this background, the issue of the wearing of the Islamic
headscarf in public schools has nevertheless been a divisive social and
political issue in Germany, especially given the large number of Turkish
Muslims living in the country. The response of the legislature and courts has
been different, however. The German legislature has enacted no laws or
regulations like those in France and Turkey prohibiting students from wearing
the headscarf in public schools or universities. Most of the cases that have
arisen have involved Muslim girls seeking exemptions from compulsory gym
and swimming classes on the grounds that the wearing of the headscarf makes
such activities impossible.101
The most controversial case in Germany has involved not a student, but
a public school teacher of Afghani origin, Fereshta Ludin, who was denied a
teaching position because she refused to remove her headscarf in the
classroom. 102 The Board of Education in the state of Baden Württemberg
argued that the wearing of the headscarf violated the state’s “neutrality” on
religion. In September 2003, however, the Federal Constitutional Court
(BVG) rejected this argument, ruling that neutrality should not be understood
as requiring a strict separation of` religious symbols from the public sphere
and that any restrictions under state law would need to treat all religions
equally.103 Given that the German government sponsors courses in religious
99. While church and state were formally separated in 1918, both the Catholic and Protestant
churches retain privileged positions in the German state. They are both accorded the status of public-law
corporations under the 1949 constitution and thus have a similar status to religions under concordatarian
systems in which agreements are made between the state and various established religious communities.
See Silvio Ferrari, The Emerging Pattern of Church and State in Western Europe: The Italian Model,
1995 BYU L. REV. 421, 422. The Basic Law provides for a “church tax” levied on all persons who claim
religious affiliation with one of the established churches. The government then allocates funds to
church-sponsored schools and hospitals, training teachers for religious instruction in public schools, and
other social services provided by the churches.
100. Katherine Pratt Ewing, Legislating Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the
Relationship Between Church and State in Germany and France, in ENGAGING CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 63, 71 (Richard A. Shweder
et al. eds., 2002). Under Article 7(3) of the constitution, religious education in state schools is a
constitutional duty for most states and must be provided in accordance with the principles of the
religious communities. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 7(3) (F.R.G.).
101. For a useful background discussion on the headscarf issue in German constitutional law,
see Matthias Mahlmann, Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The
Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf Case, 4 GER. L.J. 1099 (2003).
102. Ewing, supra note 100, at 71 (discussing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal
constitutional court] Sept. 24, 2003, 108 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 282
(F.R.G.) [hereinafter Ludin]).
103. The arguments advanced by the state in Ludin were as follows: (i) as a state official,
wearing the headscarf violated her duty of neutrality and objectivity; (ii) her actions violated the
religious freedom of children who are especially vulnerable in a classroom setting; and (iii) allowing the
wearing of the headscarf was not neutral because it expressed a state preference for a political view that
represses women and is intolerant. See id. at 73. It is interesting to note that, following the Federal
Constitutional Court’s decision, legislators in Baden Württemberg enacted a law banning the wearing of
the headscarf in public schools. This law is likely to be subject to challenge before Germany’s Supreme
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instruction and allows the wearing and display of crucifixes and other
religious symbols in the classroom, 104 the decision affirms a conception of
equality based not on individual but on group rights: i.e., public recognition of
the wearing of the hijab accords with the equality of treatment constitutionally
required as between different religious groups. 105 This position has been
supported by Dieter Grimm, a former judge on the German Constitutional
Court, on the basis that the rights to individual freedom and selfdetermination—both of which are recognized under Germany’s Basic Law—
must be interpreted together so as to protect the autonomy of different
collective ways of life. 106 Of course, such a position immediately raises
difficult questions regarding both how to ensure equality between religious
groups and how to protect individual rights within such groups. My general
point here is that the particular theory of liberal nationalism underlying the
German Basic Law—especially its recognition of the rights of religious and
cultural minorities and its accommodationist conception of state neutrality—
leads to a different, more “group-based” understanding and interpretation of
the right to religious freedom as compared to the prior cases of France and
Turkey.
D.

American Pluralism

My final example is the case of the United States, which displays certain
similarities to the German case but also one critical difference. The United
States is often held up as a strong counterexample to my argument that there is
an inherent relationship between liberalism and nationalism in sovereign
states. This is because the history of American nationalism differs in
important respects from that of any of the three countries considered so far. As
Walzer has argued, the United States is not a “‘nation of nationalities’” or a
“‘social union of social unions,’” but rather an “association of citizens.”107
Court. For analysis, see Axel Frhr. Von Campenhausen, The German Headscarf Debate, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 665, 682.
104. It should be noted that in some of the German Länder, Catholic nuns teach in public
schools, many of them in full religious dress. The Constitutional Court ruled in 1995 that a law in the
formerly Catholic state of Bavaria requiring a crucifix to be displayed in every state school classroom
was unconstitutional. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court] May 16,
1995, 93 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.). Following the decision
there was a public campaign to keep the crosses, and this resulted in a new law confirming the
obligation to display the cross but setting up an appeal system. See FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF:
A WORLD REPORT 309 (Kevin Boyle & Juliet Sheen eds., 1997).
105. For analysis of this question from a group rights perspective, see William Barbieri, Group
Rights and the Muslim Diaspora, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 907 (1999).
106. See Ewing, supra note 100, at 72. Ewing notes two features of Grimm’s argument: first,
that the history of national socialism has made Germans more sensitive to the need for group rights; and
second, that recognition of minority rights allow for a more tolerant middle ground between the two
extremes of compulsory assimilation to the German way of life on the one hand, and religious
fundamentalism on the other. Id. at 72-73. Referring to recent research showing that young women often
start to wear the hijab to lead self-chosen lives without foregoing their culture of origin, the
Constitutional Court in the Ludin case explicitly rejects the categorical presumption that wearing the
hijab is symbolic of women’s oppression. See Ludin, 108 BVerfGE 282 (333).
107. WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS, supra note 31, at 27. Thus, “[i]t never happened that a group
of people called Americans came together to form a political society called America. The people are
Americans only by virtue of having come together. And whatever identity they had before becoming
Americans, they retain (or, better, they are free to retain) afterward.” Id.
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The American constitutional framework for the coexistence of diverse citizens
severs Old World links between citizenship and nationality—or, at least,
between citizenship and any single nationality. Citizenship in the New World
requires commitment only to the abstract ideals of “‘liberty, equality and
republicanism.’” 108 These abstract ideals separate not only religion from
politics, but also culture or “all the particular forms in which religious and
national culture was, and is, expressed.” In this sense, American politics is
“relatively unqualified by religion or nationality or, alternatively, . . . qualified
by so many religions and nationalities as to be free from any one of them.”109
This conception of a liberal society imagines unity in the political and
economic spheres, but diversity in the “private” spheres of culture and religion
(the “political one and the cultural many”). 110 By not requiring cultural or
religious homogeneity in politics (the political sphere resting instead on
democratic citizenship and individual rights), the hope is that the religious and
cultural diversity of the Old World can be maintained in a single state without
persecution or repression—a country composed of many “peoples,” or a
“‘nation of nationalities.’”111 The state is therefore “neutral” in the sense that
it cannot take on the identity or character of any of the groups that it
includes—it is not a “nation-state of a particular kind and it isn’t a Christian
republic.” 112 The primary political commitment of citizens is therefore to
uphold the democratic framework within which they pursue their substantive
conceptions of the good.
Like France, America then is a constitutional democracy based on
respect for individual liberty as entrenched in a bill of rights. Not possessing
the Old World nation-state character of France, however, New World
American pluralism has no equivalent suspicion of ethnic or religious
diversity (although like France, national diversity is viewed with
suspicion). 113 Republicanism in this immigrant conception does not reflect
108. Id. at 30 (quoting P. Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in HARVARD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 32 (Stephen Thernstrom, ed., 1980)). This mirrors Hans
Kohn’s statist, territorial-civic view of nationalism as being essentially subjective, individualistic, and
voluntarist. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
109. WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS, supra note 31, at 30-31.
110. Walzer notes that the United States lacks “intense political fellowship” because culture
and religious belief are not interwoven, as Rousseau insisted, with political activity. Id. at 66-67.
“Americans are communal in their private affairs, individualist in their politics. Civil society is a
collection of groups; the state is an organization of individual citizens. And society and state, though
they constantly interact, are formally distinct.” Id. at 67.
111. Id. at 62 (attributing the coined term, “‘nation of nations’” originally to Horace Kallen).
Walzer notes that this conception of pluralism was designed as an alternative political program to the
creation of a national cultural identity and to legitimate the “manyness” of nationalities and to make it
permanent such that this “would leave those individuals who were Americans and nothing else
permanently anonymous, assimilated to a cultural nonidentity.” WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS, supra note
31, at 29.
112. Id. at 38.
113. It is well-known that France is hostile to the concept of “group” or “minority” rights and
has entered an express reservation to Article 27 of ICCPR: “In the light of article 2 of the Constitution of
the French Republic, the French Government declares that Article 27 is not applicable so far as the
Republic is concerned.” Accession of France to the ICCPR ¶ 8, Nov. 4, 1980, 1202 U.N.T.S. 395; see
also 1958 CONST. art. 2 (Fr.). See also the recent decision of the Conseil constitutionnel on this issue.
CC decision no. 2004-505DC, Nov. 19, 2004, Rec. 173 (Fr.). Given the discussion in Part IV.C, supra, it
is interesting to note the declaration made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on
April 23, 1982 in response to the French declaration on Article 27:
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assimilation towards a single national collective identity, but rather reflects
social disunity more than unity—a “straining after oneness where oneness
doesn’t exist.”114 Under this view, one would expect a law on the wearing of
religious symbols in public schools to be unconstitutional. While I do not
argue the point here, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has
generally been interpreted to provide a robust conception of the freedom to
manifest religious belief, including in public schools. 115 The banning of
students wearing yarmulkes, crucifixes, hijabs, or turbans from public
schools—even under a “neutral and generally-applicable” law or regulation—
would accordingly be open to challenge under the First Amendment absent a
compelling state interest to the contrary.116
The reasons why such a law would be unconstitutional, however, remain
deeply contested in American constitutional jurisprudence. This is because,
unlike the case of France where laïcité is accepted as defining the collective
The Federal Government refers to the declaration on article 27 made by the French
Government . . . and stresses in this context the great importance attaching to the rights
guaranteed by article 27. It interprets the French declaration as meaning that the
Constitution of the French Republic already fully guarantees the individual rights
protected by article 27.
Declaration Relating to the Declaration Made by France upon Accession with Respect to Article 27,
Apr. 23, 1982, 1275 U.N.T.S. 563.
114. This tension is nicely captured in the famous flag-salute case of West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Pledge of Allegiance is a republican oath regarded
as central to national unity. Nevertheless, here the First Amendment was held to prohibit compulsion by
the government requiring an individual to profess a belief whether religious or not.
115. The cases in this area involve both the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. See, e.g.,
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding on the basis of a free speech rationale the
Federal Equal Access Act requiring secondary schools receiving federal aid to allow religious student
groups use of school premises on the same terms as other student groups); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (exempting Amish children on free exercise grounds from public schooling after the eighth
grade). As discussed below, the more controversial question under the First Amendment has not been
the free exercise of religion in the public sphere by individuals, but rather free exercise by the majority
through the means of government. Compare the line of cases on the display of religious symbols or
messages in public schools. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Kentucky statute requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in every public schoolroom held to be unconstitutional); Sch. Dist.
of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (school prayer held unconstitutional); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer held unconstitutional). These cases were decided under the
Establishment Clause which, under the pluralist “group rights” approach discussed below, can be seen as
raising questions regarding the free exercise of religious beliefs by the “majority nation.”
116. This would apply to laws that ban the wearing of a particular religious symbol, religious
symbols generally, or all symbols. In the case of a law that prescribed a uniform that left no room for
symbols, however, such a restriction might well be deemed to be constitutional (for example, in the case
of the military as upheld in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), superseded by statute,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, Div. A, Title
V, § 508(a)(2), 101 Stat. 1019 (1987), as recognized in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)). I am
grateful to Kent Greenwalt and Gerald Neuman for this point. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the “‘compelling governmental interest’” test in Sherbert
v. Verner did not apply in the case of “an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of
conduct.” Id. at 884. Thus, the Oregon criminal law in question was neutral because it did not “target”
religion and its “incidental effect” on religious worship did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at
878. Prior to Smith, however, the Court consistently held that the strict scrutiny standard of review
applies to the enforcement of formally neutral, general laws that burden the free exercise of religion.
See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1990);
Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606-07 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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identity of the nation-state, the religion clauses in the First Amendment have
been interpreted according to not one but two conceptions of liberal
nationalism that lie in tension with each other. These conceptions mirror the
basic characteristics of the liberal and value pluralist approaches we have been
considering. Under the first conception sketched above by Walzer, there is no
“nation” as such other than the ethnically and religiously diverse individuals
who are all, equally, American citizens. This diversity can only be respected
under a liberal theory of state neutrality premised on a public-private divide
and individual rights. The difficulty here is that the meaning of the concept of
“neutrality” is essentially contested. To this question the first conception
provides a decisively non-neutral answer, albeit one that it seeks to mask
through a formalist rights discourse or, as Waldron has termed it, a fixed
“liberal algebra.” Liberal neutrality is equated with rationality or “secular
reason.”117
Once this move is made, the only question to ask is what secular reason
or rationality requires in maintaining its control over (the irrationality of)
religion and religiously inspired beliefs and practices. Does it require “laïcité”
in the French or Turkish conception of a rigid separation of the public
(political) and private (religious and cultural) spheres? Does it require a more
“accommodationist” approach in the sense of adopting a stance of “benign
neglect” neither favoring nor opposing religion and religious practices (on a
nonpreferentialist basis) and thus permitting, for example, public displays of
“ceremonial deism”? Or does it perhaps require a more “cooperationist”
approach in the German conception of a less rigid separation where the state
does not officially endorse any particular religion but is actively committed to
equal treatment and support of all religions (on a nondiscriminatory basis)? As
we shall see, each of these approaches yields different conceptions of, and
difficulties concerning, the right to freedom of religion or belief and,
accordingly, of the relationship between religious groups and the state.
These are not only legal or philosophical questions. They are also
political questions regarding how to resolve the struggle between two
incommensurable values—the religious and the secular—in particular
political communities. Given the immigrant nature of American nationalism
and its difference from the nationalisms of Old World nations, it is not
surprising that—despite its depth and maturity—First Amendment
jurisprudence has not produced a settled constitutional doctrine on the
relationship between state neutrality and religious freedom. The case law of
American courts over the last century reflects instead a formal liberal
commitment to individual liberty and a series of pragmatic attempts to realize
that ideal in a religiously and culturally diverse society. In this respect, First
Amendment jurisprudence tells the story of various political struggles and
117. The literature on post-Enlightenment accounts of reason, rationality, and neutrality is vast.
In the present context, this is most closely associated with the philosophical method of Rawls and his
heuristic device of an “original position.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Gray refers to this
species of philosophical thought as comprising the “liberal ideals of the European Enlightenment
project. . . . [which] subject[s] all human institutions to a rational criticism and of convergence on a
universal civilization whose foundation is autonomous human reason.” GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S
WAKE, supra note 6, at 15; see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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pragmatic compromises by both legislatures and courts in the absence of
agreement regarding what reason requires in the conditions of New World
pluralism.
This has included struggles not only between religious and secular views
within the mainstream majority, but also parallel struggles between the
fluctuating views of the majority and various minorities. To the extent that the
majority view has adopted the nondiscrimination principle, the first set of
struggles has been resolved by limiting religion in the public sphere, while the
second set of struggles has been resolved by limiting recognition of the
collective identities and ways of life of minorities other than to the extent that
they can be recognized as falling within the majority’s conception of what
individual religious freedom requires. The political and legal hermeneutics of
the First Amendment, in other words, may be said to represent a modus
vivendi conception of value pluralism in the conditions of a largely immigrant
society not consciously based on an historically and territorially situated
religious or cultural majority, and where the claims of religious minorities are
understood through the lens of individual, as opposed to collective, rights.118
Competing with this narrative, however, is a second conception of
liberal nationalism, which, particularly in recent years, has sought to displace
the former.119 Whereas the first conception sees only a political community of
diverse individuals, the second conception is premised on the existence of a
majority defined, despite its heterogeneous character, in ethnic, cultural, and
religious terms. This is an Anglo-Saxon, Christian (or “Judeo-Christian”)
people with a cultural heritage grounded in the values of Western civilization.
Under this second view, state neutrality requires something closer to an
accommodationist approach that takes into account not only the role of
religion generally, but also the role of the religion of the majority in particular,
in the public life and history of the nation and its institutions of government.
This approach is evident in the recent opinion of the Supreme Court
upholding the display of a monument of the Ten Commandments on the Texas
State Capitol grounds as not violating the Establishment Clause. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, endorses the idea that American “national
life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are ‘earnestly
praying, as . . . in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe . . .
guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing . . .
.]’” 120 Avoiding altogether the traditional test set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,121 the Chief Justice proceeds to state that the Court’s analysis in
118. For a discussion of “modus vivendi conceptions of pluralism,” see infra note 200 and
accompanying text.
119. I refer here, in particular, to increasing attempts by Christian groups to assert their
influence and values in the public sphere on issues as far-ranging as homosexual sex, gay marriage,
medical research, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the presence of the Ten Commandments in courthouses.
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Ten Commandments on court
grounds); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Ten Commandments in the courtroom); Elk Grove
United Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (sodomy
laws).
120. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality) (quoting Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1963)) [alterations in the original].
121. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon sets out a three-prong test: “First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
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this case is driven “by the nature of the monument,”122 which “bespeaks the
rich American tradition of religious acknowledgements.”123 Thus, the fact that
the display of the Commandments included a religious message does not
infringe the First Amendment.124
This constitutes an attempt by the conservative justices of the Court to
portray America as an Old World nation-state despite the New World
character of its society and constitution, including its Enlightenment-inspired
Bill of Rights. Public recognition of the Christian religion and Judeo-Christian
symbols springs from a desire to galvanize and define a national identity. As
has been the experience in so many other societies, “the alignment of
nationality with a dominant religion” plays an integral “mobilizing role” in
nation-building. 125 To do so, however, requires a reconsideration of the
nondiscrimination approach’s conception of neutrality as equated solely with
secular rationality in the public sphere. Religious commitments, symbols, and
practices must be reconceived as having a legitimate place in the public
sphere. As in the German case, the state is now permitted actively to
acknowledge and protect religious belief and practices in the public sphere.126
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion
(citation omitted).’” Id. at 612-13.
122. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686.
123. Id. at 690.
124. Id. (noting that the monument has both “religious significance” and “undeniable historical
meaning” and concluding that “[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message consistent
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause”). See also the dissenting
opinion of Justice Scalia in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 885 (2005), stating
that the governmental invocation of God is not an establishment and raises legitimate competing
interests:
On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling “excluded”; but on the other,
the interest of the overwhelming majority of religious believers in being able to give God
thanks and supplication as a people, and with respect to our national endeavors. Our
national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.
Id. at 900.
125. Peter G. Danchin, Religion, Religious Minorities and Human Rights: An Introduction, in
PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 1, 2 (Peter G. Danchin
& Elizabeth A. Cole eds., 2002) (noting the rise of this phenomenon in the ideological vacuum that
existed at the end of socialism).
126. It should be noted that there is a divergence of views in the Court on this question. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, for example, appear to hold to the position that the display of
religious symbols is constitutional to the extent that the state does not endorse their religious message
explicitly. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 25-44 (2004) (Rehnquist,
C.J., & O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, however, appears to hold to a stronger position,
allowing the state explicitly to recognize and endorse religious messages. Concurring with the opinion
of the Chief Justice in Van Orden, Justice Scalia articulated his position in the following terms:
I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an Establishment Clause
jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation’s past and present practices, and that can
be consistently applied—the central relevant feature of which is that there is nothing
unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God through public
prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten
Commandments.
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). For Scalia, there is no constitutional
violation where the state favors religion over nonreligion. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545
U.S. 844, 885-94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy
of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2006) (suggesting that Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary County “may
represent the beginnings of a revolution in Establishment clause jurisprudence—a wholesale rethinking
of the constitutional relationship between church and state”).

36

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33: 1

While the relationship between the religious and secular spheres is
unspecified, it is clear that the nondiscrimination principle’s banishment of
religion to the private sphere in the name of neutrality is no longer acceptable.
A different modus vivendi conception of value pluralism is thus demanded—
one that challenges the first model’s conception of the public-private divide
and correspondingly, as we shall see, of individual rights.
What is striking in this conception is the shift from a statist to a situated
understanding of nationalism. The state is to be valued as an instrument for
preserving the common history, religion, and societal culture of a majority
group or number of groups on the grounds that “members of [such] groups . . .
have a fundamental, morally significant interest in adhering to their [religion
and] culture and in sustaining [them] across generations.”127 Having thereby
substantively challenged the concept of neutrality in the public sphere, the
difficulty now becomes how to fulfill the first model’s commitments to
equality and nondiscrimination, as demanded by its scheme of individual
rights. This applies not only to all persons regardless of their religious or
cultural identity (including nonbelievers), but also to relationships between
different religious and cultural groups and identities. In relation to the latter
groups, this proposition is immediately made precarious by the existence (and
direct or indirect endorsement by the state) of a majority religious and cultural
nation. For even if one were to accept the accommodationist view (i.e., that
the Establishment Clause “bars nothing more than governmental preference
for one religion over another”),128 how does one treat all religious traditions
equally in a religiously diverse society? As the majority opinion pointed out in
McCreary, even if Christianity itself is not specifically recognized as the
national religion, the identification of God as the “God of monotheism,”
“apparently means that government should be free to approve the core beliefs
of a favored religion over the tenets of others, a view that should trouble
anyone who prizes religious liberty.”129
The inescapable consequence of an ethnocultural understanding of
nationalism is the need for a theory of collective rights. The nondiscrimination
principle is simply unable on its own to address concerns of this kind and
neither the majority in Van Orden nor traditional accounts of rights in
American jurisprudence can provide us with such a theory. As in the case of
rights discourse in France, recognition in the United States of the rights of
individuals freely to practice and realize their own ways of life and beliefs in
different ethnic and religious communities does not include collectivities as
having any corporate form or constitutional rights qua groups. American

127. GANS, supra note 49, at 7.
128. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 879 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985)
(Rehnquist J., dissenting)).
129. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 880. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, notes that the
identification of religion with “monotheism with Mosaic antecedents” flatly contradicts the framers’
specific concern with Christianity: “Justice Story probably reflected the thinking of the framing
generation when he wrote in his Commentaries that the purpose of the [Establishment] Clause was ‘not
to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.’” Id. at 880 (quoting R. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 13 (1988)).
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pluralism is thus premised on the rights of the individual and does not include
any conception of the rights of ethnic or religious groups.
In conclusion, I have argued that the liberal nondiscrimination principle
is unable to deal with the collective claims of ethnic and religious groups.
Increasingly, recognition of the importance of collective goods for individual
freedom is thus leading contemporary legal and political theorists to argue that
cultural and religious differences can only be accommodated through special
legal or constitutional measures over and above the traditional civil and
political rights of citizenship.130 As we have seen, public respect of the private
integrity of faith and the ability to participate in the public sphere as equal
citizens have not been sufficient for Muslim minorities in European
democratic states to live as autonomous individuals according to their
collective ways of life. My claim, then, is that some forms of group difference
require certain “group-specific” rights. If this is correct, the question to
address is how the defining idea of rights discourse—the principles of equality
and nondiscrimination—are to apply to a diverse spectrum of religious and
secular subjects embedded in overlapping communities for whom politics and
religion cannot be easily separated. It is to this set of questions we now turn.
V.

THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

Issues of ascriptive identity and group-specific claims generate
notoriously difficult conceptual questions for rights discourse. My argument
in this Part is that, despite these difficulties, the normative and practical
demands of strong religious and cultural pluralism are better confronted than
avoided. Doing so requires us to take more seriously the collective interests
and values at stake in a right, such as the freedom of religion and belief.
We have seen that, under the nondiscrimination principle, nothing
should distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims as citizens of a European
democratic state other than their lesser numbers. But as Talal Asad has
suggested, the concept of a minority in Europe is not a purely quantitative
concept but instead arises from “a specific Christian history: from the
dissolution of the bond that was formed immediately after the Reformation
between the established Church and the early modern state. This notion of
minority sits uncomfortably with the secular Enlightenment concept of the
abstract citizen.”131 The Reformation doctrine of cuius regio, eius religio (the
religion of the king is the religion of the people) was critical to the formation
of the early modern state.132 Later Enlightenment theory, however, as reflected
in revolutionary documents such as the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen criticized the religious inequality of the absolutist state

130. The most prominent of these has been Kymlicka. See Kymlicka, Western Political Theory,
supra note 31; Kymlicka, Introduction, supra note 38. For a useful discussion by contemporary
“multiculturalist” political theorists, see MULTICULTURALISM RECONSIDERED: CULTURE AND EQUALITY
AND ITS CRITICS (Paul Kelly ed., 2002).
131. ASAD, supra note 71, at 174.
132. For a critique of religious liberty in the early modern period, see Peter G. Danchin, The
Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in International Law Reconsidered, 23 J.L. & RELIGION
101(forthcoming 2007-08).
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and proposed instead that the “political community consists of an abstract
collection of equal citizens.”133
A direct consequence of this Enlightenment philosophy and the gradual
separation of church and state was the emergence of “minority rights” as
characteristic of national politics. Members of minorities became at once
equal citizens as members of the body politic (the state) while, at the same
time, unequal to the majority as a minority group requiring special protection.
The political inclusion of minorities has meant the acceptance of groups formed by
specific (often conflicting) historical narratives, and the embodied memories, feelings,
and desires that the narratives have helped to shape. The rights that minorities claim
include the right to maintain and perpetuate themselves as groups. “Minority rights” are
not derivable from general theories of citizenship: status is connected to membership in a
specific historical group, not in the abstract class of citizens. In that sense minorities are
no different from majorities, also a historically constituted group.134

While the nondiscrimination approach does not envisage minority rights,
these are nevertheless explicitly recognized in international human rights
instruments. In particular, Article 27 of the ICCPR provides as follows: “In
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”135 A considerable
corpus of human rights jurisprudence and scholarly comment has been
generated under this provision.136 For the purposes of my analysis, there are
three questions to address relating specifically to the protection of religious
minorities: first, what exactly is an “ethnic, religious or linguistic minority”;
second, how does Article 27 differ from other rights (such as Article 18)
recognized under the ICCPR; and third, if Article 27 entitles minority groups
to “special measures” over and above the claims of individual rights, whether
and how this can be reconciled with demands for equality and
nondiscrimination in Articles 2 and 26. I focus in the discussion that follows
on the first two questions, leaving for Part VI the question of how best to
reconcile the nondiscrimination approach with a pluralist conception of groupdifferentiated rights.

133. ASAD, supra note 71, at 174.
134. Id. at 174-75.
135. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 27. For other provisions in international instruments concerning
the rights of minorities, see Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Annex art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 92d
plen. mtg, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1993); Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities art. 8, opened for signature Feb. 1 1995, C.E.T.S. No. 157, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm; and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension, ¶ 32 (June 5-29, 1990).
136. For an excellent overview of commentary in relation to Article 27, see UNIVERSAL
MINORITY RIGHTS (Alan Phillips & Allan Rosas eds., 1997). On the broader issue of minority rights
under international law, see MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE ‘NEW’ EUROPE (Peter Cumper & Steven Wheatley
eds., 1999); Joel E. Oestreich, Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 108 (1999);
and THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1993).
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What is a “Religious Minority”?

Article 27 recognizes the rights of “persons belonging to” minority
groups. Although these rights are collective in the sense that they shall be
enjoyed “in community with the other members of their group,” they are not
expressed nor have they been interpreted as belonging to the group itself.137
Felix Ermacora has described Article 27 as a right of individuals premised on
the existence of a community, or as an individual right collectively
exercised⎯a “group protection instrument.” 138 In this respect, the article
reflects the basic orientation of the ICCPR towards individual rights while
simultaneously recognizing the importance of community to the realization of
those rights.
Like the meaning of the terms “people” and “nation,” the concept of a
“religious minority” is an essentially contested term and cannot therefore be
conclusively defined. As discussed in Part III, however, it is increasingly
recognized that belonging to “encompassing groups” with cultures of selfrecognition and identifying and being identified as belonging to such groups is
essential to many people’s well-being. 139 Nevertheless, how exactly to
recognize the subjectivity and demarcate the boundaries of such “subcommunitarian identities” remains a controversial question in political
philosophy and practice.140 Steven Lukes has referred to these as problems of
“inclusion-exclusion,” “vested interests,” and “deviancy.” 141 Similarly,
Walzer has suggested that while a state committed to pluralism such as the
United States should “defend collective as well as individual rights,” the idea
that national, ethnic, and religious groups are not merely voluntary
associations but have some political standing and legal rights encounters a
major difficulty:
[G]roups cannot be assigned rights unless they are first assigned members. There has to
be a fixed population with procedures for choosing representatives before there can be
representatives acting officially on behalf of that population. But ethnic groups in the
United States do not have, and never have had, fixed populations (American Indian tribes

137. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights [UNHCR], General Comment No. 23: The Rights
of Minorities (art. 27), ¶ 5.1, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (April 8, 1994)
[hereinafter General Comment on Article 27].
138. Felix Ermacora, The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations, in 182 RECUEIL
DES COURS 247, 308, 321 (1983).
139. See Margalit & Raz, supra note 51, at 441-61.
140. See, e.g., Leslie Green, Two Views of Collective Rights, 4 CANADIAN J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 315, 315 (1991) (distinguishing rights of “collective agents” and rights to “collective
goods” and arguing that “although both have a place in moral, political, and legal argument, only the
second can fulfil [sic] the political function generally assigned to collective rights, and even it can do so
only partially”).
141. Lukes describes the “inclusion-exclusion” problem as being how to decide which subcommunities are included in the overall framework and which are not. The problem of “vested interests”
is that “once on the official list, sub-communities want to stay there forever and keep others out.
Moreover, to get on the list, you have to be, or claim to be, an indigenous people or the victims of
colonialism, and preferably both.” Finally, the problem of “deviancy” is that not all individuals
(“rootless cosmopolitans”) fit into the sub-communitarian categories, thus creating various “non-, ex-,
trans- and anti-Identifiers.” STEVEN LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
DIVERSITY 154, 157-58 (2003) [hereinafter LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS].
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are a partial exception). Historically, corporatist arrangements have only been worked out
for groups that do.142

In the face of these conceptual uncertainties, international lawyers have
simply tended to assert that the existence of a “minority” (which may be
defined according to indigenous as well as national, ethnic, religious, cultural,
and linguistic characteristics) is a question of fact and does not depend upon
any political or legal determination by the state.143 Likewise, the identity of a
person belonging to a minority is said to be voluntary, i.e., the decision is one
for the individual to make and not the minority group itself. Therefore,
although a person will be protected from discrimination on the basis of
membership in an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority, the choice to avail
himself of any special protection afforded by Article 27 is left to the
individual, and that choice may not be vitiated by the determination of the
minority group.144
But, of course, such conceptions of the relationship between the
individual and the collective are fiercely contested. As noted by Thornberry:
Just as individuals may be destroyed by exclusion from community, so are communities
destroyed by excessive exercises in self-identification by those claiming membership of
particular communities. If we believe in the principles of individual self-identification,
can anyone join the Yanomami, or the Gypsies or the Sami? If we believe in the right of a
community to continue in existence, or communal as opposed to individual selfidentification and self-determination, can the community expel individuals who disturb
and disrupt? Can the individual reject the community?145

To say in formalistic terms that the existence of a (minority) community
is a question of fact or that communal identity is a question of selfidentification is merely to beg the question. It is clear that, while international
human rights instruments expressly recognize collective rights to selfdetermination and minority protection, there is a distinctly liberal discomfort
in the jurisprudence with such norms. As the discussion above on liberal
nationalism argued, the idea that the existence of a collective legal subject
142. WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS, supra note 31, at 69-70. The idea of a group having a given
territory and fixed population is regarded as being what distinguishes “national” from “ethnic or
linguistic” minorities. Ermacora, supra note 138, at 295. A similar point has been made by Partha
Chatterjee in the context of Muslim minorities in India. See Partha Chatterjee, Fasting for Bin Laden:
The Politics of Secularization in Contemporary India, in POWERS OF THE SECULAR MODERN: TALAL
ASAD AND HIS INTERLOCUTORS 57, 57 (David Scott & Charles Hirschkind eds., 2006) (noting that
debate in India was at an impasse because, “even though sections of Indian citizens were legally
demarcated as belonging to minority religious communities following their own personal laws and
possessing the right to establish and administer their own educational institutions, there was no
procedure to determine who would represent these minority communities in their dealings with the
state”).
143. See General Comment on Article 27, supra note 137, ¶ 5.2; see also ILO Convention (No.
169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention in Independent Countries, art. 1, ¶ 2,
adopted June 27, 1989, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169 (“Selfidentification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the
groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.”).
144. Such considerations explain why the rights recognized in Article 27 are regarded as
belonging to individual minority members. See Francesco Capotorti, Are Minorities Entitled to
Collective International Rights?, in THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
136, at 505, 508-09.
145. Patrick Thornberry, Introduction: In the Strongroom of Vocabulary, in MINORITY RIGHTS
IN THE “NEW” EUROPE, supra note 136, at 1, 4-5.
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such as a nation or a minority is solely a question of “fact” reflects a view that
avoids rather than justifies the existence and identity of the subject. In so
doing, it obscures two points: (a) that distinctive ethnocultural features of
groups cannot be recognized unproblematically by the law as objective
“facts”; 146 and (b) that a solely liberal account of communal groups as
voluntary associations formed to realize shared (but individual) desires or
preferences cannot provide a basis for drawing the boundaries between groups
and collective identities. 147 A similar tension exists in international law in
terms of recognition of nation-states, with scholars unable to reconcile the
dichotomy between the declaratory and constitutive views.148
Similarly, the idea that one’s communal identity is a matter of personal
choice—or as Asad put it above, the “belief that human beings can be
separated from their histories and traditions”—is closely tied up with
Enlightenment notions of individual self-realization and autonomy.149 In many
(perhaps most) parts of the world, this is not, however, the way people
understand their collective identities. Ascriptive characteristics of ethnicity,
religion, and language are regarded as integral to the identity of many peoples.
Recognition of collective rights thus raises conceptual difficulties not only in
terms of how boundaries are to be drawn between majority and minority
groups, but also in terms of how such boundaries shape our view of human
rights. Despite these uncertainties, and whether or not we can better manage
them through distinctions such as Kymlicka’s division between “polyethnic
immigrant societies” and “multination states,” my argument is that the
demands of religious and cultural pluralism require us to confront—rather
than avoid—the collective dimensions of individual rights such as the freedom
of religion or belief.

146. In order to assign “objective” significance to certain factual characteristics of groups such
as ethnicity, religion, or language, the law must first have an agreed theory of norms which can specify
which facts have objective significance and what rights, competences, and spheres of action such legal
subjects objectively possess. But these normative questions are deeply contested in international law. It
is this lack of consensus which prompts the move of saying that the recognition of the group is a matter
of (objective) “fact.” But this does not rescue us from the charge that such facts are subjective and
apologist because they are based on contested norms—i.e., by basing the “objectivity” of the law on
facts, the charge of normative “subjectivity” and utopianism is not thereby avoided. For a discussion of
this dilemma in international legal theory, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 40-49 (1989).
147. In order to assign “objective” significance to certain norms such as the right of peoples to
self-determination, the law must first have an agreed theory about what class of beings constitutes a
“people.” But again, this is deeply contested as a factual matter. This is what prompts the move of
saying that the recognition of the group is a matter of (objective) “norms.” But this does not rescue us
from the charge that such norms are subjective and utopian because they are based on contested facts—
i.e., by basing the “objectivity” of the law on norms, the charge of factual “subjectivity” and apologism
is not thereby avoided. Id. at 192-263.
148. Under the declaratory view, recognition of a state is a “mere declaration or
acknowledgement of an existing state of law and fact, legal personality having been conferred
previously by operation of law.” Under the constitutive view, the “political act of recognition is a
precondition of the existence of legal rights: in its extreme form this is to say that the very personality of
a state depends on the political decision of other states.” IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-88 (6th ed. 1998).
149. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Thus, many discussions on minority rights
focus on the question of the “right of exit” from indigenous and ethnic, religious, and linguistic
communities.
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Article 27 and “Special Measures”

If religious freedom is protected under Article 18, what then is the need
for Article 27? The answer to this question turns on certain perceived
limitations in the nondiscrimination principle’s conception of religious and
cultural pluralism. Article 27’s rationale is to provide additional protection of
the rights of persons belonging to minority communities. It is not clear,
however, what this means in practice. In what ways can Article 27 be said to
provide any additional protection for persons belonging to religious minorities
to profess and practice their religion other than that provided to all persons
under the general provisions covering the rights to freedom of religion and to
equal protection of the laws (i.e., under Articles 2, 18, and 26)?150 Indeed,
Capotorti has argued that this perceived lack of independent substance is
particularly evident with respect to the rights of religious as opposed to ethnic
or linguistic minorities.151
International legal scholars have sought to answer this question by
drawing a distinction between two conceptions of equality: one a “negative”
conception requiring the prevention of discrimination on the basis of
membership in a minority group, and the other a “positive” conception
requiring the protection of the distinct characteristics that distinguish
minorities from the majority. As is often noted, these two conceptions are in
tension with each other—one seemingly requiring equal or uniform treatment
of all individuals and the other requiring differential treatment or “special
measures” in favor of members of a minority group.152 Moreover, because the
rights protected under Article 27 depend “on the ability of the minority group
to maintain its culture, language or religion,” positive measures “may also be
necessary to protect the identity of a minority.”153 Kymlicka has referred to
such measures as “external protections.” They describe a situation where a
150. See General Comment on Article 27, supra note 137, ¶ 1 (“[Article 27] establishes and
recognizes a right which is conferred on individuals belonging to minority groups and which is distinct
from, and additional to, all the other rights which, as individuals in common with everyone else, they are
already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant.”).
151. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination
& Prot. of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, ¶ 227, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979) (prepared by
Francesco Capotorti) [hereinafter Capotorti Study].
152. See, e.g., LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 319-22 (1973). The U.N. report on discrimination describes a fundamental difference
between the protection of minorities on the one hand (requiring “positive action” to maintain differences
of religion, language, and culture), and the prevention of discrimination on the other (focusing on
inequality of treatment on certain prohibited grounds). The Secretary-General, The Main Causes and
Types of Discrimination, ¶¶ 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 49.XIV.3 (June 7,
1949). Guided by this distinction, the Human Rights Committee has determined that Article 27 requires
states to enact “positive measures” of protection. General Comment on Article 27, supra note 137, ¶ 6.1.
Positive action in furtherance of the protection of minorities is also endorsed by U.N. Special
Rapporteur Capotorti in his study on Article 27. Capotorti Study, supra note 151, ¶ 217 (discussing the
need for specific cultural, linguistic, and educational institutions). Such positive measures must,
however, be taken consistently with the general obligations against discrimination. See General
Comment on Article 27, supra note 137, ¶ 6.2.
153. General Comment on Article 27, supra note 137, ¶ 6.2; see also id. ¶ 9 (“The protection of
these rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural,
religious and social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a
whole.”).
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minority group demands rights against the larger society to protect it from the
economic or political decisions of the majority. The concern is the
“relationship between groups and the claim is that justice between the
minority and majority cultures requires [legal and political recognition] of
group rights which reduce the minority’s vulnerability to the decisions of the
majority.”154 For Kymlicka, external protections for minority groups need not
conflict with a liberal theory of individual freedom.155
The obligation of the state to enact special measures of protection thus
emphasizes the possibility that conditions may exist in fact—if not in law—
that prevent members of minority groups from realizing the full protection of
their rights. This may result from the existence of social or cultural prejudice
against minority groups and the state’s inability to respond to such prejudice
by virtue of the concentration of political and legislative power in the hands of
the majority.156 There is disagreement, however, on the exact nature of the
state’s obligation of minority protection. The Human Rights Committee, for
example, has not expressly addressed the question whether there is an
obligation on the state to act in a positive fashion to protect the identity of a
religious minority from destruction or assimilation. On one view, the
obligation to protect minority identity requires the state to accord minority
religions privileges and benefits similar to the dominant religion where the
minority is otherwise inhibited in the exercise of their right to freedom of
religion. However, on a different view, which regards adherence to a religious
tradition more as a matter of personal choice than of ascriptive characteristics,
the state will not be regarded as being under an obligation to intervene to
protect the identity of religious minorities (for example, where members are
freely choosing to leave the community).157
The Human Rights Committee appears to have favored the latter view
and has been suspicious of attempts to use Article 27 to justify preferential
treatment of a minority in comparison to the majority, such as in the case of

154. Kymlicka, Introduction, supra note 38, at 14. This is to be distinguished from “internal
restrictions” where a minority religious group demands rights against its own members, most often to
protect its own historic and established traditions and practices against individual dissent. Here, the
concern is the “relationship between the group and its own members, and the claim is that cultural selfpreservation requires certain ‘collective’ rights which limit the freedom of individual members to reject
or rebel against traditional religious norms.” Id. (emphasis added).
155. A liberal theory of minority rights is, however, highly skeptical about internal restrictions.
See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 7 (1995). Note, however, that some minority rights
theorists have argued in favor of internal restrictions (subject to an adequately defined right of exit from
the group) but against external protections (which artificially fix the constantly changing boundaries
between groups and also the power relations within each group). See Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any
Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 37, at 228.
156. See, e.g., Asbjørn Eide, Minority Protection and World Order: Towards a Framework for
Law and Policy, in UNIVERSAL MINORITY RIGHTS, supra note 136, at 87-88 (arguing that underlying the
concept of minority rights is “the assumption that the majority constitutes a hegemonical force which,
unless checked, is likely to cause difficulties to the minor group”).
157. As noted above by Walzer, religious and ethnic (but not national and racial) groups
function in the United States as voluntary associations, and thus their survival depends not on state
support or protection but on the “vitality of their centers.” WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS, supra note 31, at
74. Accordingly, if that “vitality cannot be sustained, pluralism will prove to be a temporary
phenomenon, a way-station on the road to American nationalism.” Id.
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the Québécois minority in Canada. 158 The key factor in the Committee’s
decisions has been to identify some coercive condition that is truly threatening
to the existence or way of life of the minority,159 or to the ability to exercise
minority rights.160 The difficulty with this approach is that it overlaps virtually
completely with the Committee’s interpretation of a state’s positive obligation
to intervene under Articles 2(1) and 26. It is for this reason that the rights of
persons belonging to religious minorities under Article 27 to profess and
practice their own religion has not been considered to add significant
independent substance to the nondiscrimination provisions of the ICCPR.
We can conclude by noting that, while Article 27 requires majority
nations to enact special measures of protection towards minorities, this
obligation is in tension with the norms of equality and nondiscrimination in
Articles 2 and 26. This raises a series of related questions: How is it possible
for the state to treat individuals equally by treating groups differently on the
basis of religion or belief? Alternatively, how is it possible for the state to
treat differently situated religious groups equally? Once one adopts a groupdifferentiated rights paradigm, the nondiscrimination model’s conception of
equality becomes more complex by several orders of magnitude.
VI. VALUE PLURALISM AS A THEORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The discussion above has illustrated how the very ideas of “majority”
and “minority” rights raise unsettling questions for liberal accounts of the
right to freedom of religion and belief. In this final Part, I argue that these
considerations suggest certain limits to the rationalist ambition of advancing a
tidy and universally applicable theory of religious freedom in international
law. This argument rests on three interrelated claims. First, Section VI.A
illustrates that a proper appreciation of the complex relationship between
individual autonomy and communal goods leads us away from rights
discourse in classical Lockean and Kantian formulations towards value
pluralism. Second, Section VI.B argues that the doctrine of value pluralism is
a coherent and attractive conceptual position in moral and political thought as
between the extremes of monism or “moral universalism” on the one hand and
antiuniversalism or “cultural relativism” on the other. And third, the
158. See Ballantyne v. Canada, Communications Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., Annex at ¶ 11.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1
(May 5, 1993) (rejecting the argument that limitation on the right to freedom of expression—through
Quebec law prohibiting use of the English language in commercial signs—was necessary in order to
protect the French-speaking linguistic minority because the prohibition was not considered a necessary
or particularly effective method of protection).
159. See Ominayak v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
38th Sess., Annex at ¶¶ 32.2, 33, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (March 26, 1990) (finding that
state development plans that threaten to destroy subsistence patterns of a Canadian Indian group violated
the right “to engage in economic and social activities which are part of the culture of the community to
which they belong” and which were protected under Article 27).
160. See Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. 24/1977, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
13th Sess., ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977 (July 30, 1981) (national law that deprived applicant
of her right to remain on tribal reserve violated her right under Article 27 to access to her native culture
and language in community with others because the reserve was the only place she could have access to
those things); Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human
Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 274.
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implications of this position are evident in the two faces of the history of
liberal toleration set out in Section VI.C.
A.

Communal Goods and Individual Rights

As a set of normative claims, collective claims of right force us to
justify, reject, or at least explain liberal theory’s blindness to the value of
communal goods. However such questions are approached, the connection
between individual autonomy and collective goods raises difficult and
contested questions about the role of autonomous choice in different forms of
human flourishing. This has two dimensions: one questioning the abstract
conception of a “free” liberal self denuded of any definite cultural or
communal identity or historical inheritance (complete with all their conflicting
demands); another asserting that the subject of agent-relative moralities is
often collective rather than personal. On the first point, value pluralists such as
Joseph Raz have emphasized the collective aspects of liberal rights and the
limits of rational choice by showing that while rights protect the well-being of
individuals, autonomous choice will only have value in a context of choiceworthy options and cultural environments possessing a range of inherently
public goods. On the second point, the well-known communitarian critics of
liberalism such as Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and
Michael Walzer have questioned the exclusive subjectivity of the individual in
political theory. As John Gray has noted, whether we look to Rawls’s “basic
liberties,” Nozick’s “side constraints,” or Dworkin’s “rights as trumps,” the
assumption is that the “subject matter of justice cannot, except indirectly, be
found in the histories of peoples, and their often tragically conflicting claims;
it must always be a matter of individual rights.”161 Value pluralists seek to
recognize and understand the claims of subjects characterized by collective
identities (peoples, nations, and minorities) and the complex role played by
collective values in any theory of justice.
In the case of cosmopolitan theories of rights, value pluralism calls into
question the exaltation of individual autonomy as the single, overarching
meta-value to the exclusion of all other values. In light of the discussion
above, we may now pause to ask: Can such a moral theory defend itself
against the claims of other comprehensive (especially religious) views
consistently with the premises of liberalism? What is it that is lost in the
pursuit of such a one-dimensional moral theory? Conversely, even in the case
of Rawls’s later political liberalism, the rigid distinction between “public”
(objective) and “private” (subjective) spheres suggests a further conceptual
narrowing in pursuit of a universally justifiable notion of human rights. Value
pluralism points in precisely the opposite direction. Rather than seeking a
narrowed-down list of rights capable of being supported by both liberal and
“nonliberal” peoples (rights whose foundations remain mysteriously elusive
all the same), value pluralism encourages a broadening of the field of
contesting values while at the same time accepting the fact of their
161. GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 5. “The consequence is that the diverse
claims of historic communities, if they are ever admitted, are always overwhelmed by the supposed
rights of individuals.” Id. at 6.
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incommensurability. As suggested by value pluralists such as Michael Walzer
and Charles Taylor, 162 this approach opens up new pathways and dynamic
possibilities for rights discourse between diverse points of view—a process
which, rather than imposing one, totalizing outlook, is capable of transforming
each of them. A corresponding point applies to the public/private distinction,
which, in political liberalism, isolates in practice large spheres of social life
(such as the family, the workplace, religious institutions, and privately funded
schools) from the lens of rights-based analysis, thus indirectly sanctioning
restrictions on human freedom. Value pluralism, as we shall see, offers a
contrary and potentially transformative means of approaching the question of
human rights in the “private sphere.”
In both cases, the difficulty derives from classical liberal theory’s
starting assumptions. Individual liberty is held to be the paramount “sacred”
value to the exclusion of all others. This is justified by a range of assumptions
whether related to the individual in a hypothetical state of nature, to human
nature, or to the relationship between the individual and sociopolitical order.
But, in the end, it is the freedom of the individual that is the relevant ethical
measure. This ignores, ab initio, another constant and powerful necessity in
human existence: our relationship to one another—the importance to human
dignity of community, of collective values, and of “group rights.” Value
pluralism asks us to take seriously the ethical nature of collective claims, not
to judge whether they are better than or equal to claims to individual liberty,
but to recognize them as objective (albeit incommensurable) ends that must be
taken into account in any conception of human rights or more general theories
of justice.
As we have seen in the context of laws proscribing the wearing of
religious symbols, the value of communal aims and forms of life has
particular and challenging implications in the area of religion and religious
freedom. Religions encompass “a world view or set of beliefs, along with a
value system and way of life embodying and expressing these beliefs.” 163
Religious traditions thus provide their adherents with a comprehensive
understanding of the world and identify the place and role of human beings
and other sentient beings within that world. These traditions
attempt to provide answers to the most basic [epistemological and ontological] questions:
the origin and meaning of existence; the nature of life and death; the meaning of suffering
and the ways to overcome it; the nature of evil and ways to overcome it; and the ultimate
destiny of human life and of all life. . . . Religion[s] call[] on [their] adherents to live
according to [their] values through a prescribed set of practices and relationships that
may affect many aspects of personal and social life. [They are n]ot merely a matter of
belief or doctrine, . . . [but actually] constitute[] an integral culture, which can form

162. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENCE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983); MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD (1994)
[hereinafter WALZER, THICK AND THIN]; CHARLES TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in
MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 39, at 44.
163. THE PROJECT ON RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS iv (John
Kelsay & Sumner B. Twiss eds., 1994).
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personal and social identity and can influence experience and behavior . . .
significantly.164

These three interrelated characteristics—(i) the fact that people worship in
groups and communities; (ii) the fact that religious practice is an integral part
of certain ways of social life and “cultures”; and (iii) the fact that religious
freedom thus requires a communal atmosphere—call into question whether a
purely individualistic approach is going to work without causing great
violence to this sphere of human existence.
One of my primary contentions, then, is that classical liberal theory’s
blindness to collective values and insensitivity to intermediate forms of
association variously situated between the abstract individual and universal
humanity are the products of a series of conceptual assumptions, which are
themselves a response to contingent historical developments. Liberalism
should, in this sense, be understood as “culturally embedded,” and the concept
of rights in classical liberal theory should not be seen as a completely “freestanding” or “impartial” morality. Rather, in Walzer’s words, liberal rights
discourse “simply designates some reiterated features of particular thick or
maximal moralities.” 165 This partiality has been well-captured by Bhikhu
Parekh in his argument that Millian (comprehensive) liberalism
linked diversity to individuality and choice, and valued the former only in so far as it was
grounded in the individualist conception of man. This ruled out several forms of
diversity. It ruled out traditional and customary ways of life, as well as those centred on
the community. It also ruled out ethnically grounded ways of life, as well as those limited
to a ‘narrow mental orbit’ or ‘not in tune’ with the dominant trend of the age. Although it
may not entirely rule them out, Millian liberalism also takes a low view of ways of life
that stress contentment and weak ambition rather than a go-getting character, or are
centred on religion, or place little value on worldly success and material abundance. As
one would expect, Millian liberalism cherishes not diversity per se but liberal diversity,
that is, diversity confined within the narrow limits of the individualist model of human
excellence.166

The unwillingness of classical liberalism to recognize collective values
as being of moral concern has created enduring incoherence in Western
164. These are the main features of the definition of “religion” suggested by The Project on
Religion and Human Rights. Id. (emphasis added). See also the definitions proposed by U.N. Economic
and Social Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, ¶
19, U.N. Sales No. E.89.XIV.3 (Dec. 1989) (prepared by Elizabeth Odio Benito) (“an explanation of the
meaning of life and how to live accordingly”). See also Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes, supra
note 15.
165. WALZER, THICK AND THIN, supra note 162, at 10. Thus, the “hope that minimalism,
grounded and expanded, might serve the cause of a universal critique is a false hope. Minimalism makes
for a certain limited, though important and heartening, solidarity. It doesn’t make for a full-blooded
universal doctrine.” Id. at 11.
166. Bhiku Parekh, Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism from Mill to Rawls, TIMES
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 25, 1994, at 11. Interestingly, Walzer, too, notes the connection between
the domination of the liberal “self” by a “single set of interests and qualities” and “certain sorts of
worldly success.” WALZER, THICK AND THIN, supra note 162, at 38. Thus, there is a price to be paid for
“complex equality” and a “many-sided development of the self”:
[The] refusal to assign the full range of social goods on the basis of a single talent or a
single achievement, in the state or the market or the arts and sciences, would deprive us
of some great and glorious achievements. But it would also free us from the domination
of tyrannical selves.
Id.

48

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33: 1

political theory and, by extension, international legal theory. 167 Once it is
recognized that complex debates over concepts such as “sovereignty” and
“statehood” presuppose the liberal structure of international legal argument, it
quickly becomes apparent that a coherent account cannot be developed
without taking more seriously collective claims of the self-determination of
“nations” and “peoples.”168 Similarly, once it is recognized that human rights
discourse in international law presupposes liberal assumptions, it is apparent
why debates over multiculturalism and the so-called “politics of difference”
are today so intractable. Collective values embedded in concepts of
nationality, ethnicity, class, race, gender, sexuality, the family, and, of course,
religion are largely invisible to classical liberalism’s sphere of moral
concern.169
Comprehensive liberalism in the Millian mold is best viewed, then, as a
“fighting creed,” which has only a weak claim to cultural neutrality. It
envisages a kaleidoscopic future of ever more permeable cultural spaces and
“mongrel selves” in which “each individual constructs an identity in the wider
society and, if the society is multicultural, will do so out of a multiplicity of
cultural fragments, bits and pieces of various cultures from here and there.”170
To some, such a detribalized and unbounded future promises an attractive
utopia.171 My concern in this Article, however, is more limited. I seek only to
consider the implications of this view for religion and religious freedom.
Viewed solely as an individual right in societies where religion is considered
largely a matter for the private sphere of “conscience” (that is, in “liberal”
societies), the classical liberal conception of religious freedom appears prima
facie unproblematic. As recognized by Rawls, however, even in modern
democratic societies—characterized as they are by the presence of a
“pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines”—this
approach raises serious questions of social stability and doubts concerning the
compossibility of rights.172
167. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
168. I am not suggesting that these concepts are themselves free from controversy, merely that
they are not a sufficiently serious part of liberal rights discourse.
169. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM ET AL., FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS
OF PATRIOTISM 133 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996) (“[T]o count people as moral equals is to treat nationality,
ethnicity, class, race and gender as ‘morally irrelevant’—as irrelevant to that equal standing . . . .”).
Lukes regards Nussbaum’s liberal cosmopolitanism as “extremist.” LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS,
supra note 141, at 22. “There is a convincing case for a more moderate cosmopolitanism that combines
egalitarian justice with the recognition of underived special responsibilities within particular
relationships and communities.” Id.
170. Jeremy Waldron, Minority Rights and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 37, at 93.
171. For a recent discussion on the merits of cosmopolitanism in legal and political theory, see
Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022 (2007).
172. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 140 (1996). It was for this reason that Rawls
shifted from his prior comprehensive to later political conception of liberalism:
[The latter view seeks] to present an account of [certain] values as those of a special
domain—the political—and hence as a freestanding view. It is left to citizens
individually—as part of liberty of conscience—to settle how they think the values of the
political domain are related to the values in their comprehensive doctrine. For we always
assume that citizens have two views, a comprehensive and a political view; and that their
overall view can be divided into two parts, suitably related.
Id. at 140. On the question of stability, see id. at 140-44.
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But more importantly, we need to ask whether liberal cosmopolitanism
can exist at all without presupposing the existence of communal and
ethnocentric forms of cultural and social life. In other words, do liberal
cosmopolitan values intrinsically rely on the existence of “parochial or devout
others” without whose presence it will not be possible to “resist the
encroachment of a homogenized global culture?”173 If the current mosaic of, if
not windowless boxes, at least culturally and religiously defined communal
spheres (nations, peoples, minorities), were to splinter successively over time
into the myriad fragments of individually chosen identities, would this be the
realization of the possibility of a “final solution” of which Berlin once
spoke—“the prospect that mankind could be made ‘just and happy and
creative and harmonious for ever’, for which no price could be too high to
pay?”174 If so, what exactly is the price to be paid, how is it to be exacted, and
what, if any, are the possible alternative futures? In a future liberal
cosmopolitan world where every person has an equal individual right to
freedom, what finally is the justification for the state itself?
Furthermore, if comprehensive liberalism raises problems of stability in
liberal democratic states, its projection into international law is likely to
generate far greater tensions and conflicts as between diverse values and ways
of life. This indeed was one of the reasons why Rawls, in his The Law of
Peoples, rejected the cosmopolitan position in international law—it denies “a
due measure of respect” between peoples and “wound[s] the self-respect of
decent nonliberal peoples as peoples, as well as their individual members, and
may lead to great bitterness and resentment.”175 The denial of such respect
requires strong reasons, and Rawls clearly does not regard cosmopolitanism as
providing such an overriding rationale. But here we need to ask: why not,
exactly? Remarkably for a liberal theorist, Rawls’s reply relies on the idea of a
people’s right to self-determination and the fact that
peoples (as opposed to states) have a definite moral nature. This nature includes a certain
proper pride and sense of honor; peoples may take a proper pride in their histories and
achievements, as what I call a “proper patriotism” allows. The due respect they ask for is
a due respect consistent with the equality of all peoples. The interests that move peoples
(and distinguish them from states) are congruent with a fair equality and a due respect for
other peoples.176

173. LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS, supra note 141, at 23. For a helpful discussion on this
point, see MICHAEL WALZER, POLITICS AND PASSION: TOWARD A MORE EGALITARIAN LIBERALISM 1418 (2004). Walzer considers, as a thought experiment, whether we can “really imagine individuals
without any involuntary ties at all, unbound by class, ethnicity, religion, race, or gender, unidentified,
utterly free?” Id. at 14. He concludes that “free choice depends on the experience of involuntary
association and on the understanding of that experience, and so does egalitarian politics.” Id. at 18.
174. Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS
IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 15 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990), cited in LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS, supra
note 141, at 90. Recall that in rejecting perfection—the possibility of “universal, timeless solutions of
problems of value”—Berlin warned that monists are likely to become “single-minded”—“ruthless
fanatics, men possessed by an all-embracing coherent vision” who “do not know the doubts and agonies
of those who cannot wholly blind themselves to reality.” ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, at
lv (1969).
175. See RAWLS, supra note 61, at 61 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 61-62 (emphasis added) (internal cross-references omitted).
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Rawls justifies his rejection of cosmopolitanism in favor of political
liberalism on the basis of a collective value—self-determination—which he
regards as having not only a moral quality, but an equal moral quality as
between all “peoples.” In so doing, he rejects any reliance on the concept of
the “State” as traditionally conceived.
Rawls’s reliance on the concept of “peoples” rather than “states” reveals
the primary source of confusion in his conception of political justice in
international law. For how, given our discussion in Section III.B above, can
Rawls defend the Romantic and communitarian notion of a people’s moral
right to self-determination consistently with the individualistic and consensual
premises of liberalism? If a “people” has moral standing under international
law, how is that status to be determined, what rights or duties flow from it,
and on what basis can self-determination be asserted or denied within
municipal legal systems? The answers to these and related questions cannot be
found within the resources of classical liberal theory itself. For answers, we
need to look beyond liberalism to value pluralism, and to confront openly the
possibility of the incommensurability of values within diverse social, cultural,
and religious ways of life. Either that, or we need to join the cosmopolitans in
their crusading faith in individual autonomy in a world of contending
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.
Of course, nothing I have said so far suggests that value pluralism leads
naturally to liberal conclusions. Indeed, the anti-liberalism of various thinkers
of the Counter-Enlightenment and modern variants of illiberal nationalism
provide evidence of the dangerous seductions of value pluralism.177 And while
ultimate values may well be incommensurable, difficult choices nevertheless
need to be made between them in situations of real conflict such as in the
affaire du foulard. It is for these reasons that I argue for an account of value
pluralism that, while taking seriously the nature of collective claims, rejects
the extreme positions of illiberal nationalism and religious fundamentalism.
For value pluralism not to lapse into the subjectivism of utopian universalism
(religious or secular fundamentalism) on the one hand, or apologetic
relativism (illiberal nationalism) on the other, it must strive for objectivity by
continually seeking an overlapping consensus on the conflicting ends that
divide cultures, groups, and individuals.178 A more nearly objective “liberal”
pluralism can therefore be achieved only by incorporating both strands of the
argument—by mediating between certain abstract individual and collective
norms and the many, diverse concrete social practices of different peoples and
groups. The rejection of an exotic, and today arguably extinct, relativism for
the possibility of an objective plurality of values thus rests on this ascendingdescending dialogic and intersubjective form. If this is correct, then, as Lukes
177. Lukes observes, for example, that Weber’s liberalism is “far from unambiguous” while
Schmitt’s “decisionist anti-liberalism” creates a “hostility to liberal democracy . . . probably unequalled
by any other major modern thinker.” LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS, supra note 141, at 94.
Kymlicka argues that the distinction between “liberal nation-building” and “illiberal nationalism” is “not
the absence of any concern with language, culture, and national identity, but rather the content, scope,
and inclusiveness of this national culture, and the modes of incorporation into it.” Kymlicka, Western
Political Theory, supra note 31, at 59.
178. In this sense, pluralists “take the values that divide cultures, groups and individuals to be
objective, whereas relativists do not.” LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS, supra note 141, at 103.
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has suggested, the case to be argued is: “Pluralism for the liberals; relativism
for the cannibals.”179
B.

Beyond Univeralism and Relativism

How does the idea of value pluralism relate to and distinguish itself from
the closely related notions of universalism and relativism? In his recent
illuminating analysis of the implications of diversity for liberal theory, Lukes
has distinguished between three conceptual positions in contemporary moral
and political thought. The first is moral universalism, which Lukes sees as
characterized by three basic ideas: (1) “universal reason” or the idea that the
focus and scope of reason and reasoning are “inherently universal” and thus
“followable by all (anyone anywhere) for whom it is to count as reasoning;”
(2) “common humanity” or the view that there exists a common human nature
shared cross-culturally and trans-historically; and (3) “cosmopolitanism” or
the Enlightenment idea that the “scope of moral concern extends to the whole
of humanity, licensing, indeed requiring, cross-cultural judgments: all human
beings have equal moral status.”180
A second, opposing, position is a strong form of antiuniversalism or
cultural relativism. This is the idea that “we cannot make judgements across
cultural boundaries (and that to do so is ethnocentric)—a doctrine
unforgettably summed up in Martin Hollis’s formula: ‘Liberalism for the
liberals, cannibalism for the cannibals.’”181 Lukes suggests that this view is
best captured by the famous sentence at the conclusion of Ruth Benedict’s
Patterns of Culture: “We shall arrive then at a more realistic social faith,
accepting as grounds of hope and as new bases for tolerance the coexisting
and equally valid patterns of life which mankind has created for itself from the
raw materials of existence.”182 Cultural relativism is, in this sense, commonly
associated with various forms of particularistic ideology and
anticosmopolitanism, including variants of nationalism.
Expressed in such general and polarizing terms, these two positions
have, over time, led to a seductive and illusory assumption: that it is
contradictory to seek to defend universalism while at the same time
recognizing cultural and religious diversity. However, a third position has also
been asserted—one that denies that relativism is the only alternative to
universalism—and that posits instead the idea of value pluralism. This view
179. Id. at 105.
180. Id. at 13-14. For Lukes, the last idea in particular has three distinct implications: (i) “it
implies a pan-human or global egalitarianism: a view about the proper scope of justice, and indeed of
morality in general;” (ii) “it implies anti-particularism, denying the Herderian thesis that individuals can
only flourish under homogeneous cultural conditions;” and (iii)
it implies a visionary social and political ideal, most powerfully expressed in the
Enlightenment by Kant and by Condorcet, who ended his Esquisse, written while fleeing
the Jacobins, by finding consolation in a “view of the human race, emancipated from its
shackles, released from the empire of fate and from the enemies of its progress,
advancing with a firm and sure step, along the path of truth, virtue and happiness.”
Id. at 14.
181. Id. at 16 (citing Martin Hollis, Is Universalism Ethnocentric?, in MULTICULTURAL
QUESTIONS 27, 36 (Christian Joppke & Steven Lukes eds., 1999)).
182. Id. at 17 (citing RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 278 (1934)).
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seeks to defend universalism, but only “in a way that takes seriously what
motivates the charge that it is ethnocentric.”183
Associated with various thinkers of the Counter-Enlightenment and
German Romanticism,184 the idea of value pluralism is best captured in Isaiah
Berlin’s nonhierarchical notion of the “incommensurability and, at times,
incompatibility of objective ends”185—the view that life affords “a plurality of
values, equally genuine, equally ultimate, above all equally objective:
incapable, therefore, of being ordered in a timeless hierarchy, or judged in
terms of some one absolute standard.” 186 By incommensurability of values,
Berlin meant not “non-additivity on some cardinal scale nor incompatibility
nor non-substitutability nor irreplaceability nor uncompensatability,” 187 but
rather that two alternatives are “incomparable: that is, . . . neither is better
than nor equal to the other.” 188 This pluralist view is distinguishable from
“relativism” and “subjectivism” and the “allegedly unbridgeable differences
of emotional attitude on which some positivists, emotivists, existentialists,
nationalists, and indeed, relativistic sociologists and anthropologists found
their accounts.”189 Thus:
The fact that the values of one culture may be incompatible with those of another, or that
they are in conflict within one culture or group or in a single human being at different
times—or, for that matter, at one and the same time—does not entail relativism of values,
only the notion of a plurality of values not structured hierarchically.190

When we speak of moral universalism and cultural relativism, we
assume that while cultures are inherently variable, certain norms—separate
from any or all cultures—are rationally and universally ascertainable. Neither
view is convincing on its own. Morality is finally agent-relative, while all
cultures share conceptions of norms which we may view as agentindependent. In what follows, I argue that while “moral universalism” is a
utopia that, by definition, is beyond reach, “cultural universalism” can (be
made to) exist. But cultures are plural, and if universal norms are genuinely to
reflect that diversity, as opposed to reflecting only one or a small number of
183. Id. at 12.
184. Lukes notes that while writers such as Burke, de Maistre, and Herder attacked the
cosmopolitan ideals of the Enlightenment, they remained “largely committed to universalism.” Thus,
Vico and Herder “insist on our need to transcend the values of our own culture or nation or class, or
those of whatever other windowless boxes some cultural relativists wish to confine us to.” Id. at 16
(citing Isaiah Berlin, Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought, reprinted in BERLIN,
CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY, supra note 174, at 70, 85).
185. Berlin, supra note 184, at 87.
186. Id. at 79.
187. LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS, supra note 141, at 63.
188. Id. (emphases added). The suggestion is not that choices don’t have to be made, but rather
that “choosing between alternatives is not the same as making a judgment about their comparable worth
. . . . even if the decision is part of a systematic pattern of such decisions and is not arbitrary.” Id. at 66.
189. Berlin, supra note 174, at 87. It should be noted that one persistent criticism of Berlin was
that his account of value pluralism was indistinguishable from relativism. See, e.g., Gerald C.
MacCallum, Berlin on the Compatibility of Values, Ideals, and “Ends,” 77 ETHICS 139 (1967); Leo
Strauss, Relativism, in RELATIVISM AND THE STUDY OF MAN 135 (Helmut Schoek & James W. Wiggins
eds., 1961); Arnaldo Momigliano, On the Pioneer Trail, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 11, 1976, at 33-38; see
also GEORGE CROWDER, ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY AND PLURALISM 114-24 (2004) (concluding that
“Berlin does succeed in showing that Vico and Herder are pluralists, not relativists”).
190. Berlin, supra note 184, at 80.
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cultural conceptions of the universal, 191 an unforced consensus must
constantly be sought through an intersubjective hermeneutics and philosophy
of critical praxis that seeks to mediate between moral maximalism and
minimalism⎯i.e., between thickly developed comprehensive views and
mutually recognized minimal norms.192 Viewed in this way, value pluralism
posits a different dialectic of the relationship between diverse values, one
which is at once neither fully universal nor fully particular. It seeks not to
defend strong antiuniversalism by proposing a senseless ethnocentrism, a view
of cultures as sealed “windowless boxes.”193 Rather, it seeks to defend a view
of “universalism that makes sense, not only of the differences that divide
cultures from one another, but also of the incoherences and contests within
them and of the very many different ways people relate to their cultural
backgrounds.”194
Applying this ethos of engagement to the three dimensions of moral
universalism referred to above, value pluralism has the following
implications: (1) while “universal reason is an indispensable presupposition of
mutual interpretation, a bridgehead within and across cultures,” we should not
“assume they even largely share our judgments about what is true, plausible or
reasonable;” (2) value pluralism implies a “similarly nuanced approach to the
question, what is human?”; and (3) in relation to any defense of the three
features of cosmopolitanism, we need to “take adequate account of the
significance of the particular (call them ‘cultural’) differences that have led
thinkers, ever since the early Romantics, to denounce cosmopolitanism as
‘uniformitarian’, bland and abstract.”195
C.

Value Pluralism and Liberal Toleration

Having set out the basic contours of value pluralism, let us then turn to
the implications of this idea for contemporary accounts of the right to freedom
of religion. In this final Section, I argue that the tension between liberal rights
and value pluralism can be seen in theorizing on the concept of toleration.
John Gray has suggested that the tradition of liberal toleration has in fact not
one but two faces: one seeking an ideal form of life through a rational
consensus on universal principles of right and justice; the other seeking
peaceful coexistence between intractably different ways of life. For Gray, the
political implications of strong value pluralism are potentially profound. In
Enlightenment’s Wake, he argued that the insights of value pluralism suggest
that the proper task for liberal theory is to reconcile the demands of a liberal
191. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 59 (1990)
(defining “cultural imperialism” as the “universalization of a dominant group’s experience and culture,
and its establishment as the norm” and as “representative of humanity as such”).
192. See WALZER, THICK AND THIN, supra note 162, at 17.
193. The phrase is Berlin’s. See Berlin, supra note 184, at 85. To the contrary, pluralism sees
cultures as “always open systems, sites of contestation and heterogeneity, of hybridization and crossfertilization, whose boundaries are inevitably indeterminate.” LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS, supra
note 141, at 34 (citing Seyla Benhabib, ‘Nous’ et ‘Les Autres’: The Politics of Complex Cultural
Dialogue in a Global Civilization, in MULTICULTURAL QUESTIONS 44 (Christian Joppke & Steven Lukes
eds., 1999).
194. LUKES, LIBERALS AND CANNIBALS, supra note 141, at 20.
195. Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
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form of life with the particularistic character of human identities and
allegiances. In the pluralist spirit of Isaiah Berlin, he thus advanced an
“agonistic” conception of liberalism, which asks us to recognize the
contingency of both selfhood and community, and to recognize that liberal
selves and cultures are themselves particular social forms and cultural
traditions.196
The central characteristics of this view suggest three lines of critique.
First, agonistic liberalism is premised on the thesis of the incommensurability
of values and argues that, rather than leading to some version of relativism,
subjectivism, or moral skepticism, this in fact generates a species of moral
realism or “objective pluralism.”197 Agonistic liberalism thus acknowledges
the existence of substantive comprehensive conceptions of the good but denies
that there can be any comprehensive theory that might rationally arbitrate their
conflicts. Second, agonistic liberalism does not claim universal authority in
reason or rely on abstract or universalizable principles. Instead, it relies on a
particular common culture and concrete historical forms of life. As Raz and
other value pluralists have argued, the content of and grounds for fundamental
rights cannot be determined until their contribution to the protection of vital
human interests has been specified. 198 If conflicts among incommensurable
values break even within the idea of liberty itself—as my discussion of laws
proscribing the wearing of religious symbols has shown—the formalism of
rights discourse will be unable to insulate it from the need to make radical
choices among disputed conceptions of the human good. In such situations of
conflicting liberties, we will have no option but to seek to settle their conflict
by assessing the impact of rights on human interests and well-being. And
third, agonistic liberalism has an ineliminably communitarian dimension in
that it views both human identity and political allegiance in terms of
participation in common forms of life. In our world, these are most obviously
“nations” or the common forms of life that national cultures encompass and
shelter. As we saw in the case of the four nation-states discussed in Part IV,
this has the result that all forms of comparatively stable political allegiance,

196. This argument appears in chapter six of GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at
64. The word “agon” means a contest or rivalrous encounter. Id. at 68.
197. Id. at 70. Gray makes three claims concerning the relationship between the universal
minimum content of morality and liberal forms of life: (1) because the values that go to make up the
universal minimum may conflict with one another and may be incommensurables (requiring radical
choices that reason alone is unable to determine), the conception of the universal minimum in agonistic
liberalism differs sharply from that of the classic natural law tradition; (2) conflicts among
incommensurable elements within the moral minimum will be resolved in different ways in accordance
with the different cultural traditions of different (and not necessarily “liberal”) regimes or ways of life;
and (3) liberal regimes may actually satisfy the minimum universal requirements of morality less well
than some nonliberal or postliberal regimes. Id. at 81-84.
198. See RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 6; see also Joseph Raz, Human Rights
Without Foundations (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (advancing an
antifoundational or “political conception” of human rights); Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced
Consensus on Human Rights, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 124 (Joanne R.
Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) (advancing an account of human rights that seeks to combine the
insights of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics with Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus).
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including within liberal states, presupposes a common (pre-political) cultural
identity reflected in the political order to which allegiance is given.199
Together, these three characteristics suggest the need to recover a form
of reasoning that appeals to a conception of political life as a “sphere of
practical reasoning whose telos is a modus vivendi, to a conception of the
political in which it is a domain devoted to the pursuit not of truth but of
peace, that has the authority of Hobbes.” 200 On this basis, Gray’s neoHobbesian view is said to be a true “political” liberalism in which the primacy
of the political over the legal or the theoretical is strongly affirmed,201 and in
which there is no a priori attachment to any ideal regime, but rather to
particular institutions “having a specific history, and to the common culture
that animates them, which itself is a creature of historical contingency.”202
The significance of Gray’s agonistic account lies in his insight that the
neo-Hobbesian and Rawlsian views, while both “liberal,” are in fact rival
projects. For this reason, it is not the coherence or superiority of either
position that is important so much as the tension and potential for
transformation between them. Contrary to the comprehensive liberalism of a
Theory of Justice, and more dynamic than the later adjustments Rawls made
in his Political Liberalism, agonistic liberalism seeks to reconcile these two
positions by asserting the limits of rational choice and directly challenging the
philosophy of history embodied in the Enlightenment project.203 In rejecting
the Rawlsian premise that principles of right can be independent of particular
conceptions of the good, it thus seeks to mediate conflicts of value between
rival views of the good in such a way that “the good has priority over the
right, but in which no one view of the good has overall priority over all
others.” 204
The central category in Rawls’s theory of justice—the history-less and
unsituated individual in a putative original position behind a veil of
ignorance—springs squarely from the philosophical anthropology of the
Enlightenment in holding that cultural difference is an inessential and
transitory incident in human affairs. This approach views distinctive cultural
199. Gray suggests that since belonging to a people or nation is a matter of historical memory
and thus of historical contingency, it follows that allegiance to a liberal state cannot avoid also being a
matter of contingency. Thus allegiance to a liberal form of life must always be a matter of “cultural
solidarity,” not of “universalizing rationality.” GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 80; cf.
WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 187-90 (2005) (criticizing Gray’s
assertion that value pluralism necessarily leads to a politics of modus vivendi absent a commitment to
expressive liberty).
200. GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 74.
201. Gray is critical of the “anti-political” character of Rawls’s Political Liberalism for seeking
to remove the distinguishing features of the political (indeterminacy and contingency) from both its
method and its results. From the perspective of value pluralism, this is both utopian and unrealizable.
The idea of a constitutional or jurisprudential theory in which ad hoc judgments of political discourse
are supplanted by disciplined legal decisions on major questions in the restraint of liberty is an illusion.
It merely leads to the politicization of law as courts become the arenas for political struggle. This in turn
leads to the corrosion of the virtue of civility as the idea of compromise between conflicting interests
and ideals is gradually lost. See GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 77.
202. Id. at 78.
203. Gray describes the core of the Enlightenment as the “displacement of local, customary or
traditional moralities, and of all forms of transcendental faith, by a critical or rational morality, which
was projected as the basis of a universal civilization.” Id. at 123.
204. GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at 135.
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identities—and the practices that they variously embody such as the wearing
of religious symbols—as individually “chosen lifestyles” whose proper place
is in private life or the sphere of voluntary association. Any demand that
“cultural identities have political embodiment—in sovereign nationhood, for
example—is [thus] perceived as a form of atavism, inconsistent with
modernity—in which, however, it is by far the most potent political force.”205
By contrast, Joseph Raz’s idea of “inherently public goods” suggests
that the activity of choosing has little value if there is not available to the
chooser a range of worthwhile options, as embodied in a rich public culture or
form of common life.206 Central then to value pluralism is the assertion that
there are valuable options, genuine goods, and “authentic forms of human
flourishing whose matrices are the social structures of nonliberal societies” in
which individual choice may variously be constrained, limited, or understood
in conflicting ways. A single-minded and exclusively rationalistic conception
of individual freedom fails to recognize that such values and goods will be
“crowded out or driven out, or survive only as pale shadows of themselves, in
liberal societies, once their undergirding social structures have been knocked
away.” 207 Furthermore, the practice of analyzing cultural and religious
diversity solely through the lenses of rational choice, individual preferences,
and personal plans of life as opposed to as between conflicting and
exclusionary ways of life, fails to recognize that membership in cultural and
religious groups (and, indeed, in nation-states themselves) is typically
unchosen and that religious and cultural identity has historically been more
ascriptive than elective.208
The political implications of strong value pluralism may, in fact, dictate
that liberal practice—even in its “agonistic” form—enjoys no theoretical
privileges.209 For this reason, Gray has now advanced an account of what he
205. GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 124.
206. RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 6, at 198-200.
207. GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 84. Gray draws squarely on Alasdair
MacIntyre regarding the failure of the Enlightenment project’s objective of finding a free-standing
rational justification of liberal political morality. As MacIntyre states:
On the one hand the individual moral agent, freed from hierarchy and teleology,
conceives of himself and is conceived by moral philosophers as sovereign in his moral
authority. On the other hand the inherited, if partially transformed rules of morality have
to be found some new status, deprived as they have been of their older teleological
character and their even more ancient categorical character as expressions of ultimately
divine law.
MACINTYRE, supra note 57, at 60. For Gray, this collapse gives “contemporary moral discourse its
distinctive character of emotivism or subjectivism, in which moral judgments are in the end assimilated
to preferences, and of deep incoherence.” GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 148. It is
merely the “long shadow cast in the slow eclipse of Christian transcendental faith” with the result that
we today live “among the fragments of archaic moral vocabularies, whose undergirding structure of
metaphysical and religious beliefs has long since collapsed.” Id. at 152.
208. Echoing Raz, Gray powerfully notes that:
[I]n the real world of human history . . . cultural identities are not constituted,
voluntaristically, by acts of choice; they arise by inheritance, and by recognition. They
are fates rather than choices. It is this fated character of cultural identity which gives it its
agonistic, and sometimes tragic character.
GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 124.
209. Gray points to the tension between strong value pluralism and the priority accorded to
personal autonomy in both Berlin and Raz. “There seems to be a tension, perhaps ineradicable in Raz’s
liberalism, between the radically historicized and contextualized account of autonomy he advances and
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terms “modus vivendi pluralism” in contrast to his earlier position of “pluralist
liberalism.”210 This more recent account places no particular weight on the
four constitutive features of classical liberal theory—i.e., moral or normative
individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism211—and envisages
instead not individuals but communities as the fundamental units of political
and legal pluralism. This move has two grounds of justification: first, a
“Hobbesian” ground, which asserts that the legal recognition of different
communities will promote peace; and second, a “Herderian” ground, which
suggests that recognition of the cultural identities of peoples commingled in
the same territory in the legal order to which they are subject will stop
inevitable secessionist struggles.212
Legal pluralism of this kind is merely the “institutional embodiment of
the human need for strong forms of common life in circumstances of
substantial cultural diversity.” 213 Because it recognizes forms of diversity
beyond individual life plans informed by personal conceptions of the good,
and takes seriously the plurality of whole ways of life complete with their
associated conflicting moralities and often exclusionary allegiances, this
conception poses direct challenges to the liberal idea of a neutral state. Central
among these, as we have seen, is that value pluralism of this kind involves
conceptions of the good that resist legal privatization and relegation to the
private sphere of voluntary association, which is their fate under the neutrality
of the liberal state. Modus vivendi pluralism seeks not to suppress or deny the
the central and dominating role he wishes autonomy to have in political morality.” Id. at 142. If Raz is
correct that liberalism is itself a whole way of life rather than a set of neutral political principles on
questions such as personal autonomy, then the liberal form of life can have no special or universal claim
on reason.
210. Gray’s shift from agonistic liberalism to modus vivendi pluralism suggests the possibility
of a range of different types of value pluralism. This suggestion is borne out in recent work in legal and
political philosophy. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, PLURALISM 8 (2005) (developing an account of
“multidimensional pluralism” which includes the idea of a “thick network pluralism that exceeds both
shallow, secular models of pluralism and the thick idea of the highly centered nation”); GEORGE
CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 135-62 (2002) (arguing that value pluralism leads in
fact to a strong form of liberalism whose central value is autonomy understood as a form of positive
rather than negative liberty); GALSTON, supra note 199, at 69 (defending a pluralist liberal account based
on three concepts—“value pluralism, political pluralism, and expressive liberty”); Bonnie Honig, The
Politics of Agonism, 21 POL. THEORY 532 (1993) (advancing a conception of “agonistic” democracy and
institutions capable of diminishing the significance of existing, pre-political loyalties and attachments);
John Kekes, Pluralism and the Value of Life, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 44 (1994) (rejecting the dismissal
by “postmodern agonistic democrats” of even the possibility of conflict resolution and examining the
kinds of institutions and mechanisms that may help to mediate conflict and forge agreement).
211. The four constitutive elements of liberalism are as follows: (1) moral individualism, which
holds that, since nothing has ultimate value except states of mind or feeling, or aspects of the lives of
human individuals, the claims of individuals will always defeat those of collectivities, institutions, or
forms of life; (2) egalitarianism, which is the denial of any natural or political hierarchy among human
beings and holds that the human species is a single status moral community and that monarchy,
hierarchy, and subordination are practices standing in need of an ethical defense; (3) universalism,
which holds that there are weighty duties or rights that are owed to all human beings, regardless of their
cultural inheritances or historical circumstances, just in virtue of their standing as human beings; and (4)
meliorism, which holds that even if human institutions are imperfectible, they are nonetheless open to
indefinite improvement by the judicious use of critical reason. See JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM:
STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 286-87, 314-20 (1993).
212. GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE, supra note 6, at 136. Gray here invokes Thomas
Hobbes, as a primary author of liberal toleration, and Johann Gottfried von Herder, as a primary author
of counter-Enlightenment romanticism. Id. at 67, 130 (Hobbes), 165 (Herder).
213. Id. at 136.
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demands of subjects such as Muslim minority groups in European nationstates, but rather to create a diversity of jurisdictions for the various
contending communities to reach (provisional) settlements. The legal system
of India, for example, is just such a “mixed” conception of a political order,
which is in part individualist and secular but also partly Islamic and partly
Hindu, complete with all the conflicts of jurisdiction that such plural
inheritances give rise to in the laws of marriage and the family.214
Modus vivendi pluralism requires us to reimagine our concepts of human
rights and democracy. Human rights must now be seen not as free-standing
universal principles, but as social conventions constantly being contested and
refashioned in a world of plural societies and patchwork states.
Human rights are not immutable truths, free-standing moral absolutes
whose contents are self-evident. They are conventions, whose contents vary as
circumstances and human interests vary. They should be regarded not as a
charter for a worldwide regime, liberal or otherwise, but rather as embodying
minimum standards of political legitimacy, to be applied to all regimes.215
On this view, human rights are enforceable conventions that provide
protection against injuries to certain human interests that make any kind of
worthwhile life impossible. This conception generates certain “objective”
minimal standards of decency and legitimacy, but these cannot be liberal
values writ large. Nor can there be any final or definitive “list” of human
rights. Judgments about human interests will shift as threats to human interests
change. Seeking a definition of human rights is not (or not only) an inquiry
into a preexisting metaphysical truth, but a question demanding a practical
decision: which human interests warrant universal protection? The legitimacy

214. A useful illustration of this dynamic is the Shah Bano case in India. Mohammed Ahmed
Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844 (India). The case involved a conflict between Muslim
Personal Law, which required only the return of the marriage settlement upon divorce, and the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which required monthly maintenance in specified situations of need. Confronted
with a conflict between a legal autonomy regime protecting India’s Muslim minority and the uniform
Indian criminal code protecting the equal rights of women regardless of religion, the court held that the
criminal statute overrode personal law in cases of conflict and that destitute women should not be denied
the general protection of the criminal law on the basis of their religion. This led to widespread protests
by Muslim leaders who argued that enforcing the uniform maintenance provisions violated the religious
freedom of Muslims. Subsequently, the government conceded to political pressure and passed the
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986 which provides that Muslim women do
not have a right to maintenance unless at the time of marriage the couple elect to submit themselves to
the maintenance provisions of the Code. The main danger perceived by the Muslim minority was that,
under the uniform Criminal Procedure Code, the shari’a (and Muslim identity more broadly) would
come under attack by secularizing, assimilationist forces, “enforc[ing] majoritarian Hindu values on all
Indians.” BRUCE B. LAWRENCE, SHATTERING THE MYTH: ISLAM BEYOND VIOLENCE 134 (1998). This
fear was not unfounded given the Supreme Court’s support for the unfinished task under Article 44 of
the Constitution to develop a common civil code that would end the autonomy of the Muslim
community in determining personal and family law. The Court has criticized Islam for its systematic
maltreatment of women, thus reflecting the view of the Hindu majority that state intervention is
necessary to “save” Muslim women from the oppression of their religion and culture. As has been noted,
such an approach risks essentializing Islamic culture and history and constructing Muslims as an
indivisible community without its own internal divisions, contests and struggles over the meaning of
social justice and gender equality in matters of family and personal law. See VEENA DAS, CRITICAL
EVENTS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONTEMPORARY INDIA 98 (1995). See infra Part VII
for further discussion of this case.
215. GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at 106.
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of any political regime is then correlated to the degree to which it is actually
successful in preventing systematic injury to a wide range of such interests.
Because the right to freedom of religion is a complicated bundle of
entitlements, each made up of a diversity of claims, it protects a range of
human interests that are often at odds. When conflicts arise (as they do even
as between or within the most minimal rights), these can reasonably be settled
in different ways. Proselytism is legally prohibited in Greece, Malaysia, and
China; nevertheless, these states claim to protect freedom of religious belief
and practice.216 In this respect, these states are qualified regimes of toleration
that depend for their existence on a historically situated authority able to
enforce a broadly shared and thus legitimate conception of a common life. As
a point of intersection for competing claims between different groups and
individuals, the right to religious freedom must yield in certain instances to
the demands of public peace without which the exercise of freedom of religion
itself could not be guaranteed.217
The notion of modus vivendi thus argues that both rights-based liberal
conceptions of the individual subject and communitarian philosophies of ideal
community are misguided ways to approach societies strongly divided by the
opposed ethical beliefs of diverse religious and cultural groups. In Thomas
Nagel’s words, both are “views from nowhere” that seriously fail to take into
account conflicts of interest or value and the fact of “hybridity”—the
condition whereby individuals belong not to one but to several ways of life,
with all their conflicts.218 In such situations, there can be no overarching or
final consensus on values. Given that the interpenetration of different ways of
life is an inescapable fact, the need for coexistence points not toward
consensus on common values, but rather toward the development of common
institutions through which conflicts of rival values can be mediated and
provisionally settled. States must, in other words, reflect the plurality and
hybridity of common identities. The difficulty, of course, comes in meeting
this condition and in establishing the necessary degree of legitimacy between
differently situated individuals and groups.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for an account of value pluralism in international
legal theory animated not by a comprehensive moral theory governing all
ways of life, but rather the search for peaceful coexistence between different
ways of life. Value pluralism is best understood in this respect as encouraging
an ethos of cultivation and engagement by attempting to reach political
216. See Stahnke, supra note 160, at 251, 286-89, 307-10.
217. GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM, supra note 32, at 112-13. “Where there is a history of
division among communities with distinct religious traditions, unqualified freedom of religion may in
fact be a prelude to renewed conflict.” Id. at 132. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia
at a Time of Tumultuous Transition: A Historical Theory, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 285 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) (arguing
that the 1997 Russian law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations was not only an
acceptable limitation on the right to religious freedom of certain (proselytizing) minority religions in
Russia’s struggle to establish new religion-state relationships following the collapse of communism and
“official atheism,” but in fact a necessary one given the historical and societal factors at issue).
218. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).
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settlements and forms of reconciliation between the claims, values, and
practices of diverse religious and cultural communities, and the assertions of
right and justice to which they continually give rise. 219 How this is to be
achieved in any particular situation involving a manifestation of religion or
belief can only be the result of a fragile and circumstantial consensus, derived
through an intersubjective hermeneutics and philosophy of critical praxis.
We have seen how contemporary controversies such as the affaire du
foulard and cases such as Shah Bano—situations where a minority asserts a
claim of right to religious freedom against the majority while at the same time
imposing certain restrictions on its own internal minorities—illustrate the
great complexity of this dialectic. In such genuine cases of conflicting rights, I
have argued that no general or universal theory is possible. Any just (and
uncoerced) resolution must depend on the character and weight of the
particular rights involved and on the social and historical context. This
requires recognition of and mediation between at least three different kinds of
consideration: (i) between competing conceptions of the appropriate rightsholders (whether a minority versus a majority, or an individual versus a
minority or majority); (ii) between the relevant goods and interests at stake
(whether individual or collective, religious or secular); and (iii) between the
particular claims of right that these goods and interests ground (whether
individual or collective claims to autonomy or identity).
In Part IV, we saw how struggles over the wearing of the Islamic
headscarf played out in four nation-states with different histories and varying
background conceptions of these three considerations. Similarly, Shah Bano
can be seen to illustrate the importance of recognizing that such cases raise
competing conceptions of equality: on the one hand, collective claims to
religious identity and difference, on the other hand, individual claims to
personal autonomy regardless of religion. My central assertion in Part III was
that while the nondiscrimination principle privileges the latter over the former,
a value pluralist approach seeks to satisfy and mediate both claims—the
demand for substantive equality between religious and cultural groups in a
theory of toleration and differential treatment by the state and the demand for
substantive equality in terms of the treatment by the religious minority of the
autonomy of its own members.220 The attempt to satisfy both equality claims
219. This dynamic is evident in the literature on liberal toleration. See, e.g., William A.
Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516 (1995) (juxtaposing, in the context of the Yoder
decision, opposing liberal conceptions of autonomy and diversity); David Owen, Political Philosophy in
a Post-Imperial Voice: James Tully and the Politics of Cultural Recognition, 28 ECON. & SOC’Y 520
(1999) (distinguishing two Enlightenment traditions of public reason, one an abstract and universalizing
activity that reflects on historically and culturally situated practices of practical reasoning “from above”
and legislates their character and limits, the other always dependent to some extent on historically and
culturally situated practices of practical reasoning, and so the methodological extension of the selfreflective character of such practices).
220. How, exactly, a minority group might protect the interests of women on issues such as
maintenance and divorce will, of course, involve complex and contested questions of communal and
individual value that will differ in differing political communities. As Raz has argued, the “same social
arrangements can have different social meanings, and therefore differing moral significance, in the
context of different cultures.” Joseph Raz, How Perfect Should One Be? And Whose Culture Is?, in IS
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 98, 98 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999). Whether, for example,
the final political settlement reached following Shah Bano of a right of exit of individuals to submit
themselves to the uniform criminal law is sufficient to protect the rights of Muslim women is sure to be
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creates a situation of complex equality and genuine value pluralism by
enabling different religious and cultural groups to “adjust and change to a new
form of existence within a larger community, while preserving their integrity,
pride in their identity, and continuity with their past and with others of the
same culture in different countries.”221
Value pluralism thus holds that the freedom to manifest religion or belief
does not include the right of Muslims in Europe, or any other majority or
minority religious group, to elevate their faith into the established faith
governing all others in a political regime. At the same time, value pluralism
requires a “reassessment on the part of secular, enlightened Europeans of their
own tendency to treat belief as neatly separable from disciplinary practices,
cultural routines, and the education of sensory experience.”222 Classical liberal
theory’s assumption of religious belief in the private realm and of abstract
citizenship in the public sphere as the defining features of modernity remains
plausible only so long as the Kantian liberal algebra is thought to provide an
independent means by which to reach authoritative public agreements without
recourse to the comprehensive views of citizens. The problem, as we have
seen, is that no single conception of reason or public discourse is able to fulfill
this task. It is not the admirable Kantian quest for multiple faiths to coexist in
the same public space that is problematic, but rather the dogmatic assertion
that this can only be done in one way. By pursuing an ethos of engagement in
public life among a plurality of controversial theistic and nontheistic
perspectives, value pluralism opens ways for us to transcend this impasse and
reimagine the limits of liberal theory.
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